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INTRODUCTION 
I. Social Setting for Guaranteed Wage Plans 
The very word "guarantee" connotes insecurity, and a 
natural desire to provide for a condition of limited oppor-
tunity. No guarantee is more basic to earth's children than 
food, clothing, and shelter. Necessarily tied to the acquisi-
tion of these basic human staples is the means by which they 
are to be attained. 
Although medicine, transportation, communication, and 
production have made man more optimistic over future pros-
perity, the workers of even such a productive nation as the 
United States are pessimistic of future economic security. 
One eminent author's analysis of this insecurity complex of 
workers is stated in the following words: 
The scarcity consciousness of the manualist is a product 
of two main causes, one lying in himself and the other 
outside. The typical manualist is aware of his lack of 
native capacity for availing himself of economic oppor-
tunities as they lie amidst the complex and ever shift-
ing situations of modern business. He knows himself 
neither for a born taker of risks nor for the possessor 
of a sufficiently agile mind ever to feel at home in the 
midst of the uncertain game of competitive business. 
Added to this is his conviction that for him the world 
has been rendered one of scarcity by an institutional 
order ot things, which purposely reserved the best 
opportunities for landlords, capitalists, and other 
1 
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privileged persons. 1 
It is impossible to overemphasize the laboring masses' 
search for a guarantee against economic insecurity. In the 
face of a foe armed with the seemingly invincible offensive 
weapons of money, political power, and education the American 
labor movement pursued its struggle for human recognition 
relentlessly. American union-aspirations centered around 
economic security as opposed to the heavy political emphaSis 
characteristic of the European labor organizations. 
With the ultimate ascent of Gomperian voluntarism the 
American labor movement could concentrate on the attainment 
of its end. 2 The AF of L's attempt at union organ1zation suf-
fered many set-backs from 1900 to 1932 on the legislative, 
judicial, and economic fronts, but the lessons were vivid 
enough to afford valuable experienoe for such a young and 
dynamic social institution. 
Two important factors 1n the 1930's removed the last 
impediments to freedom and growth ot the American labor move-
lSelig Perlman, A Theorl of the Labor Movement (New York: 
Augustus Kelley, 19~9), pp. 239=2~-----
2For a fuller treatment of the philosophy of the early 
American Labor Movement as seen in the AF of L and the mind 
of its leader, Samuel Gompers, who piloted the Federation 
through 70 years of its most crucial period, see sevent
r 
Years 
~ Life ~ Labor (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co" 1925 . 
ment--one, the New Deal, pro-labor legislation, from 1932 to 
1930; and the other, creation of the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (CIO), came about with the split in the House 
3 
of Labor over the fate of the industrial worker at the Atlantic 
City Convention of the AF of L in 193,.3 
The New Deal legislation embodied such important pro-
labor laws as the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, 
the National Labor Relations Act of 193" the Social Security 
Act of 193" and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. This 
legislation was the outcome of a growing social awareness per-
mitted heretofore only in the more "radical" social movements. 
This social awareness was beginning to aoquire a "respectable" 
atmosphere and, hence, becoming acceptable to even the more 
conservative Amerioan social groups. It was becoming more and 
more the recognized duty of the government to provide at least 
the means so that all men could attain a minimum of economic 
security. New Deal legislation was both the culmination of 
this general recognition and the guide for a formal concreti-
zation of the direction toward which economic security was 
tending for American workers. 
The other factor stimulating the desire for economic 
38ee Saul Alensky's intimate biography entitled John 1. 
Lewis (New York: G P. Putman's Sons, 19~9) for the factIonal 
growth of the industrial versus craft union spirit within the 
AF of L during the 1930's. 
4 
security at this time, although quite intangible in its spe-
cific aspects, was nutured by the CIO. This organization was 
established to organize the unorganized, to lift the economic 
standards of the mass of dependent workers in this country_ 
Such cosmic aspirations manifested themselves in the CIO's 
predilection for the unSkilled and semi-skilled workers in 
auto, steel, rubber, and coal. The AF of L, on the other 
hand, had always believed that the "aristocracy of labor" in 
the key craft unions was the leverage by which organized labor 
would win all workers their just share of American industrial 
wealth. 4 
In light of this resume of prevailing social philosophies 
afoot 1n the two main labor federations and the country-at-
large in 1940, it is obvious from what sector new approaches 
to income security would spring. With the "freeze" of wages 
by the War Labor Board during World War II the militant CIO 
cast about for other ways to satisfy the rank-and-file. An 
elaborate system of Ufringe tt benefits followed, and a new 
interest in guaranteed wage plans was resurrected by the CIO 
Steelworkers in 1943. This demand was quickly refused by the 
~he fascinating discussion of divergent social philoso-
phies of the AF of Land CIO from 1935 to 1947 is set down by 
Eddie Levinson in his journalistic book, Labor on the March (New York: University Books, 1947). -- ---
--
War Labor Board with this closely-reasoned statement: 
The facts set forth by the panel report indicate that 
this demand in its present form 'Would, if granted, sub-
Ject the industry to such serious financial risks . . . 
as to be unworkable. These risks could be reduced by 
modifications and safeguards worked out through collec-
tive bargaining, but in the present state of the ooun-
try's information on the subject the Board is not pre-
pared ... to impose suoh guarantees by o~der.' 
II. The Rationale of Guaranteed Wage Plans before 1947 
The Steelworkers' proposal was truly a resurreotion of 
interest in guaranteed wage plans. The year 1894 dates the 
first recorded guaranteed wage plan,6 but the interest gen-
erated in the intervening years until 1943 1s reduced to in-
significance by the developments of the last fifteen years. 
Wisely, the WPB prevailed on the President of the United 
States to authorize a comprehensive study of guaranteed wages 
by an independent study of guaranteed wages by an independent 
committee. The PreSident aSSigned the job to the Advisory 
Board, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion in 1946, 
whioh in turn set-up a research staff known as the Guaranteed 
Wage Study, under the direction ot Murry W. Latimer, then 
5Nationa1 War Labor Board, Termination Report (1947), 111, 
1068. 
68 . Harbert Unterberger~ Guaranteed waSi and SunPlementary 
unemplo~nt Pay Plans (New york: Commerce C earing ouse, Inc., 19 r: p. 1;. 
6 
chairman of the United States Railroad Retirement Board. 7 
The outcome of this study embodied the definitive "Latimer 
Report" of 19lt7 which remained the ubible" and most compre-
hensive guide to guaranteed wage plans up to that time. In 
the Introduction of this 473 page report the projected impor-
tance of future guaranteed wage demands was stated in these 
words: 
The trend toward guaranteed wage demands, unmistakable 
though it is has not had sufficient time to become 
deeply ingratted in labor organizatiOns and their policy. 
Because security is of such great importance, and because 
the failure of an ill-advised effort to achieve security 
may have tremendous repercussions on the attitude of 
workers and on the stability of the economy, every essay 
at security should be subjected to critical analysis at 
an early stage before emotions become aroused. aSuch a 
critical analysis is the object of this report. 
For the purposes of its study the Latimer Report defined a 
guaranteed wage plan as one ttunder which an employer guaran-
tees to all or a defined unit of his employees a wage or em-
ployment for at least 3 months.,,9 The verb "guarantees" in 
the above definition is of historical importanoe, for prior 
to 1940 the "guarantee" appears to have been conditional since 
7Murray Latimer, Guaranteed Wages--Report to the Presi-
dent by the Advisory Board, 19lt7 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. 
Government Printing Office, 1947). 
8 
.!J?!g., p • l. 
9Ibid., p. 2. 
--
7 
it seems they were financed, where necessary, by the employer 
essentially on a pay-as-you-go basis. 
However, despite the conditional nature of the wage and 
job guarantees which these plans exhibited, there was a stead-
ily increasing acceptance of a real social need for guaranteed 
wage protection. All plans prior to the Social Security Act 
of 1935 can generally be attributed to individual social aware-
ness of single employers, or at most, to the initiative of 
labor leaders in the skilled or semi-skilled segments of in-
dustry. The solidification of the social need for guaranteed 
wage plans was complete with the financial cataclysm of 1929. 
The words of the Latimer Report are eloquent in their paucity: 
The tragedy, suffering! and frustration which character-
ized the 12 year period (1929 to 19~1) produced a deep-
rooted demand for security--of which the guaranteed wage 
is becoming one of the most important expressions. 10 
The desire of the people for economic security was recognized 
by Congress, the legislative culmination was inevitable some 
nine years later, when the Congress of the United States passed 
the last of two acts which would strongly affect the future of 
guaranteed annual wage plans. 
The first federal act which was to exert many direct and 
indirect influences on guaranteed wage plans was passed by 
lOlp'~d., p. 10. 
8 
Congress in 1935. The Social Security Act laced together the 
four main areas of security which the poor of a nation feel 
most keenly--economic security against Sickness, unemployment, 
old age, and death. From the aspect of economic security 
against unemployment the Act provided for state rather than 
federal administration. 
However the federal authority does exercise control over 
state administration. There are a number of situations in 
which the state may not deny the eligibly unemployed applicant 
his compensation. The Act makes the following stipulations: 
(a) applicant need not accept a job opening which is available 
due to a strike, lockout. or other labor dispute, (b) nor if 
the wages, hours, or working conditions are substantially less 
favorable than those prevailing for Similar work in the local-
ity, and (c) if, as a condition of employment the individual 
must jOin, reSign from, or refrain from Joining a bona fide 
labor organization. ll 
This federal eommittment of responsibility for the unem-
ployed worker proved abortive as a stimulating factor the 
growth of guaranteed wage plans. Concerning the effect of the 
Social Security Act upon guaranteed wage plans the Latimer 
llJohn G. Turnbull, C. Arthur Williams, and Earl F. Cheit, 
Economic and Social Securitr (New York: The Ronald Press Com-
pany, I9~ p. 191 ... 
9 
Report states: 
The Social Security Act permitted State laws to include 
provisions designed to encourage, within certain limits, 
the substitution of a wage guarantee plan for unemploy-
ment insurance. Under specified conditions guaranteeing 
employers were to be allowed lower unemployment oontribu-
tions by rate. At the same time, however, the Social 
Seourity Act permitted States to reduce rates to other 
employers, under certain Circumstances, on about the 
same terms. Because the reduced rates without the wage 
guarantee involved no additional financial obligation on 
the part of the employer, the wage guarantee provision 
offered no advantage. The tormulators of State laws, 
therefore, at no time became interested in it to any ex-
tent. 12 
In tact, the Act had definite regressive effects on guaranteed 
wage plans previously negotiated. The reason for this phenom-
enon is again cited in the Report. 
Before the enactment of the Social Secur1ty Act, W1scon-
sin permitted complete exemption ot employers from the 
provisions of the unemployment insurance act if they 
guaranteed ln advance 36 hours of work for ~2 weeks. 
Some 96 employers sought and were granted exemptions 
effective 1n 1934. The law was changed in 1935 to con-
form with the Social Security Act, and without exception, 
emploY!fS promptly discontinued their guaranteed wage 
plans. j 
The second piece of federal legislatlon which wal to 
affect the negotiation of guaranteed wage plans was enacted by 
Congress in 1938. By means of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938 the federal government attempted to set at least a minimum 
l2Latimer, loco clt., pp. 12-13. 
13Ibid' t p. 13· 
--
10 
standard for wages, hours, and control of child labor. The 
following stipulation in regard to maximum hours was recorded 
in Section 7 (a) of the Act: 14 
No employer shall, except as otherwise provided in the 
section, employ any of his employees who are engaged in 
commerce or 1n the production of goods for commerce--for 
a workweek longer than forty hours after the expiration 
of the second year from such date unless such employee 
receives compensation for his employment in excess of 
the hours above specified at a rate not less than one 
and one-half times the regular rate at which he is em-
ployed. 
However, in an effort to encourage the idea of regular employ-
ment by employers, the Act made the following exemption from 
Section 7 (a): 
• . • if an employer and a certified union entered into 
a collective bargaining agreement which provided for 
ei ther a maximum of fifty-two weeks of em'ployment for 
2 000 hours (changed to 2 080 hours 1n 19~1); or twenty-
sIx weeks of work for 1,000 hours. Where such contracts 
were bargained, employers were permitted to average out 
overtime, and ~o work employees up to twelve hours a day, 
or fifty-six hours a week without incurring penalty. If 
the 2,080 or 1,040 hoursla&xima were eXceeded, the over-
time exemption was lost. , 
However, this provision also proved abortive, as a means of 
stimulating the growth of guaranteed wage or employment plans. 
The statistical proof of this ineffectiveness is again suc-
14~ /2 U. S. Stat. c. 1060, sec. 31,107 (1938). 
referred to as the Wage and Hour Law. 
Commonly 
l'Turnbull at al., loco cit., p. 448. In Chapter 16 a 
fine analySiS 1s presented of the legislative history behind 
the Fair Labor Standards Act and its impact today. (See 
footnote 11 above.) 
11 
oinctly stated in the Report: l6 
In more than 8 years since the Fair Labor Standards Act 
went into effect only 60 such agreements or proposed 
agreements have been filed with the Wage and Hour Divi-
sion of the Department of Labor, which administers the 
act. Of these, apparently no more than 14 covered an 
operating plan involving a waiver of premium overtime. 
The total number of operating plans, so far as is known, 
has been less than 20. At present, at the end of 8 
years, apparently only 6 plans involving the overtime 
waiver are in operation. 
In summary of the overall effect of legislation on the 
pre-l9~7 experiments in private guaranteed wage plans and those 
covering also employment, the Report states: 
In part, the meager results of intended legislation en-
couragements reflects the fact that a succeSSful guaran-
teed wage plan must be highly individualistic. Thls 
characteristlc makes the legislating of encouragements a 
matter of peculiar difficulty. This does not mean that 
legislative encouragement is imposslble. In the past, 
however, efforts have been based upon erroneous notions 
of the king of encouragement needed. The notlon that a 
guarantee of wages can properly be substituted for unem-
ployment lnaurance is an example. The two are really 
complementary and would work better together than inde-
pendently. This legislation intended to encourage guaran-
teed wages would be more fruitful if it permitted guaran-
tees by waY70f supplementation to unemployment benefit 
lnsurance.~ 
III. The Rationale of Guaranteed Annual Wage Plans after 19~7 
The 1ncreased interest 1n guaranteed wage plans since 
l6Lat1mer, ~ clt., p. 13. 
l7Ib1d. 
12 
1947 is due, in a significant degree, to the scholarly research 
which produced the Latimer Report. In its complete and un-
biased assessment of legislative, economic, and social events 
which have influenced the history of guaranteed wage plans 
over the past fifty years, the Report has become the indispen-
sable guide for scholar and practitioner alike of guaranteed 
wage plans. The impaot of the Report oan hardly be overesti-
mated, for, even though there has been a deep-rooted demand 
for security in the United States since 1929, there must be 
an instrument by Which this demand can be satisfied. If a 
social demand is created with no means of satisfaction only 
frustration can ensue. Although the Latimer Report was not 
specific in outlining the best form of employment security 
device to follo~, to discerning labor, management, and legis-
lative leaders the specific outlines for successful guaranteed 
wage plans were adequately analyzed. le 
The definitive sentence in the recommendations of the 
Latimer Report which effected all provate guaranteed wage at-
~empted since 1947 states: 
18The Latimer Report includes a comprehensive review of 
guaranteed wage plans, cost estimates for guaranteeing wages 
in number of establishments, and recommendations of measures 
~hieh would increase the feasibility and applicability of 
guaranteed wages, as well as an analysis of the economic 
effects of guaranteed wages. 
13 
Thus legislation intended to encourage guaranteed wages 
would be more fruitful if it permitted guarantees by way 
of supplementation of unemployment insurance. 19 
This concept, of a wage guarantee "by way of supplementation 
to unemployment insurance," has made its impact felt in almost 
every guaranteed pay plan since the promulgation of the Latimer 
Report. As the initiative tor earlier plans came from manage-
ment who were considerably enlightened and progressive--
Proctor and Gamble, Hormel, and Nunn-Bush--so the renascence 
of guaranteed wage plans after the Latimer Report were ini-
tiated almost exclusively by union leaders. 
The ineffectual efforts of the Steelworkers to secure a 
guaranteed wage plan from the War Labor Board in 1943 did not 
end their attempts. Using the findings ot the Latimer Report 
the Steelworkers submitted a significantly revised pay plan to 
the Wage Stabilization Board in 1951. One author has made the 
following comparison between the principal features of the 
1951 and 1943 plans introduced by the Steelworkers. 20 
(1) Employees with three years of continuous service were 
to be covered--not every employee as previously pro-
posed. 
(2) The employers' costs were to be limited to an agreed-
19Latimer, ~. cit., p. 13. 
20Unterberger ~. cit., p. 18, cited from A Guaranteed ~age Plan for the WorKerS-Ot the Steel IndustrY,-Unlon-EiEIbit 
o. 1~9;IT, Wage Stabilization Board Case No. D-18-C. 
(3) 
(4) 
14 
upon rate of contribution to a trust fund. Approxi-
mately seven cents per hour vas suggested--far differ-
ent from the unlimited liability previously proposed. 
For each week in vhich the employee was laid off or 
terminated because of shutdown, up to a maximum of 
52 consecutive weeks the employee vas to receive 30 
times the standard hourly wage rate for the job class 
in which he worked more hours than any other during 
the preceding 13 weeks. 
Out of the trust fund, the laid-off employee would be 
paid the difference between any state unemployment 
compensation benefits payable to him and his guaran-
teed amount. 
An employee vho had income from employment in a week 
in which he was eligible for benefits would be en-
titled to the difference between his income and his 
guaranteed amount plus $10. 
(6) To receive benefits a covered employee would have to 
be able to work and be available for suitable work. 
The initiative for a more widespread application of eco-
nomic security for the working masses was now placed where it 
would be more effective. A powerful union like the Steelwork-
ers with a membership of 1,250,000 strategically located in 
basic and processed steel industries allover the United States 
was in a most advantageous position to exert widespread influ-
ence on the future of guaranteed wage plans. This influence 
was reinforced by the higher degree of centralized control 
which has characterized the eIO industrial unions since their 
inception in 1935. Also, the heavy concentration of low-paid 
unskilled and semi-Skilled workers in the industrial unions 
made guaranteed wage plans a greater necessity than it would 
have been for the skilled craft workers of the AF of L with 
their high salaries and built-in seasonal compensations. How-
ever, the Steelworkers proposal was not activated in any 
labor-management agreement during 1951. The introduction of 
a guaranteed wage plan as a supplement to unemployment bene-
fits would have to await another strong industrial union's 
initiative. 
The United Automobile Workers, CIO, entered the research 
on union-inspired guaranteed wage plans in 1951. Its impaot 
was soon felt and progress reports were released periodioally 
to the public as a reminder of things to oome. Guaranteed 
annual wages (GAW) became hot-copy for every business or 
labor-orientated periodicals in the country. The following 
extracts are charaoteristic: 
An economic time bomb is about to go off on the labor-
management front. If the blast occurs, it will be over 
the demands of Walter Reuther's United Automobile Workers 
for a guaranteed annual wage.2~ 
The guaranteed annual wage, as the demand is generally 
known, or the guaranteed employment plan, as the U.A.W. 
more correctly terms it, is not Simply a plan for supple-
mentary unemployment compensitIon. . . • Walter Ruether's 
aim-is vastly different. What he proposes is a system of 
penalties to force the industry to abandon its seasonal 
pattern of production and marketlng1 to provide year-round 
work for workers with seniority. Ie he should win, then 
the next step . • • would be to end the system of hiring 
21Francis J. Corrigan, "Big G.A.W. Debate," Soclal Order, 
V (April, 1955), 15,. 
--
16 
a factory worker by the hour, and to pay him instead by 
the week. 22 
All eyes were on Detroit and GAW became a fait accompli in the 
auto industry on June 30, 1955, This initial contract with 
the Ford Motor Company immediately doubled the number of work-
ers covered by guaranteed wages in the United States. Chrysler 
and General Motors succumbed quickly to similar demands of the 
U.A.W., and a new era for GAW was begun. The Steelworkers 
capitalized on the U.A.W. fS initiative and soon proposed and 
secured GAW agreements with Amerioan Can Company and Continen-
tal Can. 
It was soon apparent that GAW was a misnomer for the new 
j 
type of guarantee plans. The new plans were denominated sup-
plementary Unemployment Benefits Plans (SUB). The labor edi-
tor tor America briefly reoords the philosophy behind this 
name change: 
Strictly speaking. the term "guaranteed annual wage" is a 
misnomer. As originally advooated by the late Phillip 
Murray toward the end of World War II it meant exactly 
what it says: the guarantee by an empioyer to an employe 
of 52 tull paychecks 1n the oourse of a year. 
That is not what it means today in Detroit or Pittsburgh 
or Chicago, where the Auto Workers, the Steelworkers, and 
the Paokinghouse Workers are demanding a "guaranteed 
annual wage." What these unions are really asking for is 
22Daniel Bell, "Beyond the 'Annual Wage, Itt Fortune, May, 1955, p. 92. 
17 
an employer-fi~anced s~pplemen~ !g ~~employment ~~nefits 
compensation. 2j 
One reason tor the advance of guaranteed plans is well-
expressed by the following statement: 
Labor's new demands are bolstered by a serious decline in 
the ratio of unemployment benefits to wages--off more than 
20 percent from pra-war figures. 
If present compensation could be doubled so that workers 
received approximately 60 percent of their wages in bene-
fits, there would not be the crescendo shout for the 
guaranteed annual wage. 
The same would hold if the eligible period were extended 
from 26 to 40 or more weeks.2~ 
Add to this the bargaining power of many American labor unions 
and the success of SUB is apparent. 
This is an excellent example of Pope Pius IX's principle 
of subsidiarity in action. In lieu of state intervention to 
supplement the inadequacies of unemployment insurance which 
have steadily increased over the past 20 years, the private 
institutions by bargaining initiative can and should seek to 
settle this problem in the most equitable manner for all con-
cerned. Rev. Joseph M. Becker, 8.J., a recognized authority 
on social security makes this pertinent remark regarding the 
23Benjamin L. Masse, ttGuaranteed Wages and Jobless Pay, U 
America, XCIII (April 9, 1955), 37. 
24Ibid.~ cited for T~amster's Report from Washington, 
Fe bruarY;-!9, 5. 
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Ford Plan as accepted by the industry from the U.A.W.: 25 
A favorable aspect ot G.A.W. in the auto industry is that 
it relies on private group activity rather than on gov-
ernmental activity to meet the threat of unemployment. 
Although the Auto Workers' plan has held the spotlight 
for GAW and gained the publicity--due to the auto manufactur-
er's pivotal position in the American industrial complex--
there has been other successful union-inspired plans at work. 
The International Brotherhood of Teamsters (lET) was able to 
negotiate GAW plans in their cartage and wholesale warehoasing 
union contracts as far back as November 11, 1952. At that 
time Teamsters' Local 688 of Joint Council No. 13 in St. Louis 
contracted for GAW with Brown Shoe Company of the same city. 
With the subsequent prosecution ~f union contracts from 1953-
1955 Local 638 negotiated GAW with 68 firms for about 4,500 of 
its 10,017 members. 26 
Rice-Stix, Inc., a wholesale clothing manufacturer with 
a warehousing operation in St. Louis was the second firm to 
contract the GAW with Local 688 on March 1, 1953. On May 5, 
1955 Local 688's publicity director could write concerning the 
CAW plans it had negotiated on the St. Louis area: 
25Joseph M. Becker, "G. A. W. for the Auto Workers," Social 
Order, June, 1955, p. 203. . -
26uWages and Working Conditions,," Bulletin of Teamster's 
Local 683, St. LOUiS, January 30, 19,6. 
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While the program of unemployment in the St, Louis area 
has created several acute situations, it has not been 
deep enough to affect the protected areas of the guaran-
teed wage program. Therefore, the Union's experience 
under the program to date has been perhaps more academic 
and in the nature of refining principles and mechanics 
of future operations, than in the practical considera-
tions that may be ~yolved in any day-to-day developments 
within the program. ( 
The need for this statement was precipitated by the widespread 
inquiry into GAW generated by the impending U.A.W. guaranteed 
wage plan with the auto industry. The Bureau of National 
Affairs made a study of GAW a short time before the above 
statement was released, and concerning the plans of Local 688 
they commented: 
Contractually, the St. Louis guaranteed annual wage plan 
represents as simple and brief an approach to this much-
debated issue a negotiator is likely to find. 
This area of purely "academic" experience with the GAW 
plans was to change for the Teamsters in a short time. With 
the national decline of the wholesale warehousing industry 
Rice-Stix saw that its GAW committment would soon be put to 
the test. On liovember 30, 1956 the GAW was modified into an 
srJB plan by joint approval of the Company and!Jnion 4 
Although this plan covered only 420 workers--65 percent 
of the total employees--in a single warehousing operation, it 
27"Guaranteed Annual Wage Plan, n Re port of Teamster's 
Local 688, May 5, 1955. 
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supplied an excellent opportunity to study the impact ot an 
actual s~rn plan in a condition of permanent lay-off. 
CHAPTER II 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Late in 19,2 Local 688 of the St. Louis Teamsters devised 
a Five-Year Package Contract 1n tlan effort to establish maxi-
mum confidence in the area of labor-management relations. u20 
This contract was a creation of the union's research division 
and sought to "eliminate the piecemeal, irrational and some-
what emotional approach to the traditional collective bargain-
ing process, without sacrificing the historical perogatives of 
either side.,,29 Besides the wage increases this package con-
tract included a guaranteed annual wage, hot cargo clause 
(worker does not have to handle goods of a struck firm), cost-
of-living escalator, insurance-pension, health and hospital, 
and blood donor provisions. During the calendar year of 19,3 
approximately 40 percent of Local 638's 10,017 members were 
brought under the a~verage of Five Year Package plans. 30 
28rrom an interview with Edward Brown, Chief Negotiator, 
Teamster's Local 6a8, on January 14, 19,a, 
29Ibid., January 14, 19,8. 
30wages and Workin, Condit10ns, Series No. 21 January 1, 
1954, JoInt councIl ofeamsters Ro. 13, Internat10nal Brother-
hood of -Teamsters , p. 12. 
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The key issue underlying Five Year contract is maximum 
job and union security. The provision of a guaranteed annual 
wage fs more conducive to maximum job security for the worker 
than any other provision in the Five Year plan. As of Dece~ 
ber 31, 1953 there were 65 firms employing 4,530 employees 
covered by the guaranteed annual wage proviSion. 3l 
Why had the Teamsters included this GAW provision in 
their contract at this particular time? The motivation behind 
the Teamsters' GAW drive, according to the Teamster spokesman 
who negotiated the plan, was "to provide sOllie income security 
to workers in an insecure industry. ,,32 The strategic geo-
graphical position of St. Louis early marked the city as a 
center of the wholesale distribution industry. By 19,0, how-
ever, the whole industry was in a state of decline. This 
decline can be traced to a series of factors. Retail market-
ing operators were in the process of evolution and the chain 
store was the principal dynamic factor. These stores faoili-
tated a condition of large-scale buying directly from the 
manufacturing concern with the consequent decline ot neighbor-
hood dry-goods stores. Technological advances also demanded 
3l Ibid., p. 16 (see Appendix A tor a summary of all the 
GAW plans negotiated by Local 688 ot the St. Louis Teamsters). 
32Interview with Looal 688 1s Field Director, April 4, 
1958. 
a change in warehousing techniques, if the industry was to 
maintain its competitive advantage or, at least, position. 
23 
For the most part the old-line St. Louis distribution firms 
were insensible to the signs of the times, and consequently, 
the union saw 1ay-offs ahead if renovations were not made. It 
even teared that some firms might vacate the St. Louis area 
tor less-unionized areas. In at least one case, according to 
the Teamster union, there was a definite decision to do 80. 
These faotors caused the research men of the Teamster 
union to devise an off-setting security device in order to 
protect its rank-and-fi1e. In some instances the GAW plan was 
designed to deter some firms from moving out of town, and in 
others as an incentive to stabilize operations. In the latter 
instance the 60 percent coverage was designed to permit f1exi-
bility--nto give them something to live with, II as one Teamster 
official expressed it. 
The first St. Louis firm with whom Local 68d negotiated 
the GAW plan was the Brown Shoe Company on November 1" 1952. 
Rice-Stix contraoted the GAW obligation March 1, 1953 to be-
oome the second firm oovered by the plan. From 1953 to 1955, 
63 more firms contracted the GAW, which was merely one of the 
six important prOVisions of the Five-Year Plan. 
The provision of the GAW plan in the contraots of all 65 
firms was substantially the same. The plan is quite simple 
-and briefly expressed as was mentioned before when discussing 
the Bureau of National Affairs comment on the Teamster's GAW. 
The Rlce-Stix Company, with a total work force of 700, had 
the following representative plan: 
It is understood and agreed that the first 420 employees 
on the seniority list shall be guaranteed employment for 
at least 2,000 straight time hours each contract year 
beginning with March 1, 1953. This guarantee shall be 
absolute and not be excused for any reason excepting the 
failure or refusal of employees to work or for discharge 
for cause or for military leave, or for mutually agreed 
upon leave of absence. Further, this guarantee shall be 
exclusive of overtime hours worked which shall not be 
counted against or included in the guarantee. 
It is understood that whenever there is a separation 
of any individual who was covered by the guarantee the 
next employee on the seniority list shall replaoe the 
separated individual on the guaranteed list so that the 
number (420) is maintained. Furthermore, it is under-
stood that any employee returning from service in the 
Armed Forces! or anyone returning from a mutually agreed 
upon leave or absencel will displace on the guaranteed list anyone who was h red to replace him during his 
absence, and that said displaced individual will be 
dropped from the guaranteed list. The returning employee 
will so far as the guarantee is concerned take the hours 
of employment of the individual whom he displaced and the 
Company will therefore, during the balance of that year 
be required to guarantee the returning employee only the 
differenoe between 2,000 hours and the total worked by 
his replacement prior to his return. 
This guarantee shall continue in effect until March 
1, 1955 and from year to year thereafter, during the 
period of this contract, unless the Company gives notice 
at least sixty (60) days prior to March 1 1955, or any 
subsequent Maroh 1, of its desire to modify this guaran-
tee. In the event such notioe is given the parties Shall 
oonfer in an effort to reach agreement but in the event 
the parties are unable to reach agreement then the Union 
shall at the expiration of sixty (60) days following the 
said notioe have the right to resort to its economic 
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strength to support its position. 33 
What has been said above concerning the general con-
spectus of the St. Louis conditions can be applied, ! !2+.tiori, 
to the Rice-Stix operation. Rice-Stix experienced healthy cor-
porate growth through ninety-three years of its eXistence, but 
stagnancy of technological progress began to take its toll in 
1947. The Company fell from a net income of 19.5 percent of 
, 
capital invested (including contingenoy, reserves and earned 
surplus, but exoluding inoome tax reserves) in 1946 to a low 
of 2.7 peroent in 1953. 34 
At the time of negotiations in Maroh of 1953 there was no 
sign ot a need for the GAW plan which the Company and Union 
had negotiated as a normal contract provision. The 60 percent 
seniority coverage seemed to provide a more than adequate 
~rgin tor business fluctuations and possible lay-offs, Even 
when "changes in metnods of warehousing and distribution were 
anticipated,,3; it still seemed that the need for the use of 
33A&reement by and between Rice-Stix, Ino. and Warehouse 
and Distribution Workers Union Local 638, St. LouiS, Missouri. 
See Appendix A for the minor differences between the CAW plans 
as contraoted by the Teamster represented firms. 
34See Appendix B for the net income figures of Rlce-Stix 
trom 1947 to 1954. 
35Management Record, "GAW with an SUB Twist," June, 1957, 
p. 194. 
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GAW was comfortably improbable. 
However, this whole conspectus had changed by late 19~. 
The Company profit margin was at 2.7 percent and its owners 
were trying to hold off a stock raid by a New York textile 
concern. On November 26, 1954 The Wall Street ~ournal carried 
a story of the proceedings with this title. TEAMSTERS FOREGO 
PAY RISE TO HELP RICE-STIX BATTLE RELIANCE'S OFFER. The union 
had agreed to forego the pay increases called for by the 5 
year agreement in order to keep the ownership ot the Company 
in St. Louis. 
The Company had approached the union as early as September 
seeking mitigation from the forthcoming wage increases con-
tracted in the Five Year Plan eighteen months earlier. The 
Union was unwilling to grant these concessions maintaining 
"that improvements in efficiency would man that the Company 
would be able to handle the forthcoming increases in wages.,,36 
These "improvements in efficiencytf failed to materialize and 
the profit margin oontinued to decline. The stock of Rice-
Sttx had been averaging $30 to $32 per share during the summer 
on the American Stock Exchange. However, at the same time 
equity per common share was placed at $69.49. 37 
36case Problems in Industrial Relations, Institute of 
Labor Reiations, UnIverSity of IllinoIs (referred to hereafter 
as Case Problems), p. 5. 
37corporat1on Records, Standard and Poor. 
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In protestations to the Union, management officials 
pointed out that low return on Company investment and the con-
sequent reduction in dividends had depressed the price of the 
stock. In an attempt to rebut this statement the Union main-
tained that dividends could have been paid due to the Company's 
strong position in terms of liquid assets and reserves, if the 
Company had any real desire to hold up the price of its stock 
on the Exchange. As a result of the Company's financial posi-
tion, it presented an attractive situation for sharp investors 
to gain control with the object of liquidating for the quick 
profits from the salable assets. Reliance Manufacturing Co., 
a New York textile o amp any , was reported buying large blooks 
of Rice-Stix stock for reasons of the prospective liquidation 
profit and in order to use the Rice-Stix brand names on 
Reliance products. 
In light of these dark prospects the Union entered into 
an effort with management to defeat the advances of Reliance 
Manufacturing Company. On Thanksgiving Eve 19,4, the manage-
ment and Union carried their problem to the rank-and-file in a 
meeting at Kiel Auditorium in St. Louis. A management spokes-
man presented the intentions of Reliance, as he saw it, and 
the Union leadership asked for a vote of confidence in the 
negotiating committee. The leadership assured the union mem-
bers that it would do all that it possibly could to protect 
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the standing pension and job security agreements and to make 
the best possible supplemental agreement. There was some 
opposition to the proposition, but the membership voted 30~ 
to 146 to support the leadership's request,38 
The negotiating committee acted quickly and two days 
later the newspapers carried this report: "while the rest 
of St. Louis ate Thanksgiving Dinner, a three-man committee 
from Local 688 of the Teamsters met with three Rice-Stic offi-
cials in a huge, silent warehouse. There they hammered out a 
memorandum in which the union gave up wage increases and fringe 
benefits estimated to total $800,000 over the remainder of the 
contract which runs to February 28, 1958. tl39 Eight days later 
on December 4, 1954 the price of stock had shot up on Rice-
Stix stock to $45 per share on the American Stock Exchange, 
due to the interest created by the raiders and the publicity 
given the company because of the union concession. With this 
brighter earnings picture brought about by fixing labor costs 
and with union cooperation in effecting savings, the Company 
could concentrate on stream-lining its warehousing operation. 40 
However, the Jnlon concessions did not seem to convince Earnest 
38Case Problems, p, 14. 
39~all Street Journal, Friday, November 26, 1954, p 2. 
40Business Week, December 4, 1954, p. 118. 
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w. Stix and Fred B. Eiseman, president and vice-president, re-
spectively, even after they had promised "they would not sell 
their stock to Reliance. ,,41 On December 19, 1954 these men 
sold their combined holdings to Reliance at $46 per share, 
after having decided "that Reliance at present already con-
trolled enough stock to force a proxy fight. ,,42 
The Teamsters had come to the rescue of Rice-Stix in 
order Uta keep the Company in friendly hands of men who wanted 
to operate, instead of letting someone just interested in 
liquidation for fast profit take over the business.,,43 With 
the sale of Rice-Stu to Reliance all the Union's fears were 
to come true. After a protracted proxy fight between Reliance 
and Safie Bros_, a New York textile manufacturer, the Safies 
came out on top.44 Thus only eight months after Reliance had 
gained control of Rice-Stix it was to lose it in a struggle 
with Safie. 
The Safie Bros. coup g' !1!! was delivered on August 27, 
1955 and on September 10, 1955 Business Week dramatically 
41Ibid., December 25, 1954, p. 60 . 
.... 2Ibig. 
43Business Week, December 14, 195 .... , p. 117. 
44See Appendix C for an interesting description of the 
power contest between Reliance and Safie Bros. in F9rtune 
magazine, October, 1955, p. 177. 
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described the power contest: "Rice-Stu, Inc., . ' would 
now wound up in control of Safie Bros., a New York Textile 
company. The latest episode in the Rice-Stix serial starred 
Joseph M, Safie, executive vice-president of Safie Bros. lilt, 
With Rice-Stix controlled by Satie Bros., it looked as 
if the Teamsters Union and its members would have a more prom-
ising future for security in their jobs. This hope was 
strengthened on February 21, 19,6 when Safie renewed the lease 
on Rice-Stix's Washington Avenue property in St. Louis for 
another ten years at the cost of nearly one million dollars. lt6 
During June 19,6 Safie consolidated its position in the 
wholesale women's garment industry by acquiring the holdings 
of two Los Angeles firms ($1,000,000) and two Atlanta firms 
(price not given).~7 
As the efforts of the Teamsters to assist the original 
Stix-Eiseman owners had failed, the Union decided on reinstate-
ment of the wage increase of May 1, 19".48 Within six months 
the future of Rice-Stix has been mapped-out by the Saties, and 
the following report was made public: "Rice-Stu stockholders 
4'~USi~ Week, September 19, 19", 
lt6Standard and Poor, Corporation Records, April, 19,6. 
lt7 6 rug., August, 19, . 
43GloB!-pemocrat (St. Louis), July 13, 1956 
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approve sale of Company's manufacturing plants and mills so as 
to concentrate on sales and distribution. ,,49 
With this major reorganization planned, Safie saw that 
the Rice-Stix GAW would constitute a heavy liability, In 
accordance with the original contract, which called for re-
opening privileges if either party so deSired, the Union was 
called in and after negotiations were completed both labor and 
management agreed to substitute a supplemental benefit (SUB) 
program to be known as the Income Security Plan in place of 
the old GAW plan. This amended agreement enabled the Company 
to cut their original liability by an amount equal to $26 per 
week for 26 weeks, Which laid-off workers are entitled to by 
the provisions of the Missouri State Unemployment Program 
Things moved quickly now and on December 14, 19,6 a stock 
journal carried this entry: "Pursuant to Company's plan of re-
organization approved by the stockholders on November 26, 1956 
common stockholders have been invited to tender shares for sale 
to the Company at $69 per share.It'O This reorganization re-
duced the Riee-Stix capital stock and surplus from 20.3 million 
to 8.1 million dollars. 51 Total employment at the Company was 
49~., November 30, 1956. 
50~~odl Industrials, December 14, 1956. 
51~usiness We!!, December 1, 1956, 
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now 368 persons. Even in the face of a guaranteed annual. wage, 
;2 employees found work elsewhere since a lay-off seemed in-
evitable. On December l~, 19;6 the Rice-Stix warehousing oper-
ations laid-off permanently 68 of the total employment of 368. 
Even with this significant move there was no offioial 
statement concerning the future of the Rice-Stix warehousing 
operation. It was evident, however, that the st. Louis oper-
ation was to be curtailed as layoffs continued during January 
19;7. By January 31, 19;7 Rice-Stix has laid-off 130 employees 
with eligibility under the amended agreement of November 30, 
19;6. Another ~O employees were laid-off in February and ~d 
1n March.;2 Company officials finally made public their plan 
for Rice-Stix when they give this statement to the papers on 
March 22, 19;7: "This move from St. Louis to New York 1s part 
of management's plan to concentrate on the more profitable 
lines of its business.,,;3 
Personnel were dismissed as soon as liquidation would 
permit in the respective departments of the cler1cal and oper-
ative sections of the warehouse. By May 31 only a handful of 
key personnel remained, and their duties were mostly concerned 
with administration of the supplementary unemployment benefit 
;2Rice-Stix Personnel Files, 
;3Glote-Democrat, March 22, 19;7. 
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plan. A final press release was given to the local papers on 
November 12, 1957= "Liquidation of Rlce-Stix, Inc., . 
moved nearer to completion today when the stockholders voted 
to dissolve the corporation, with assets to be sold to Reliance 
Manufacturing Co., New York City, for book value. u5l.t This 
amounted to no more than a book entry for Reliance already 
owned 99t percent of Rice-Stix stock.. However, this date does 
record the final denoument of a 9l.t-year-old St. Louis firm 
which once has a work force of 900 employees. 
The amended agreement of the CAW plan of ~Iovember 30, 1956 
was now one year old. Reliance had laid-off 68 workers under 
the terms of this plan one year before on December 13, 1956. 
Consequently, on December 31, 1957 these 63 workers either 
terminated their eligibility to draw benefits or exhausted 
their benefits altogether. January 31, 1958 terminated the 
eligibility of 78 more ex-employees, The final cut-off date 
of the Plan came on February 28, 1958, since the remaining 222 
workers originally covered by the Plan were put on the laid-
off roster the preceding February when the Company announced 
its liquidation plans. 
/' ,\ 
5l.tIbid., November 12, 1957. ~ :. : 
---
CHAPTER III 
THE PLAN 
Following the events described in Chapter One, the Co~ 
pany and the Union agreed to a modification of the original 
Guaranteed Annual Wage Provision, a modification resulting in 
a switch to a Supplemental Unemployment Benefits Plan. The 
complete amending agreement has been incorporated as an appen-
dix. 
This SUB, known as the "Income Security Plan, tt re-defined 
the obligation under the guaranteed annual wage to mean that 
for a period of 2,000 hours after layoff an employee would be 
guaranteed the same take-home pay that he would have received 
had he continued in Rice-Stix employ. However, the laid-off 
employee would now have to register for state unemployment 
compensation and seek other employment in order to receive the 
payment. In addition, it would be agreed that any income the 
laid-off employee received from unemployment compensation or 
other employment could be deducted from the company's obliga-
tion. The pertinent provisions and administrative provisions 
are included as follows: 
Financing - The company was to make contributions to a 
fund set up under a trustee. The initial contribution was to 
3l.t 
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be no less than 10 percent of payroll, with additional con-
tributions made by the company as required to maintain the fund 
1n a liquid state. Money 1n the fund was to be invested in 
government securities, with earnings therefrom credited to the 
fund. The fund paid all costs of administering the plan. 
Amount of Applicant's Weekly Benefit - An eligible appli-
oant was entitled to an amount, which when added to his state 
unemployment benefit would equal 100 percent of his weekly 
after tax straight time pay_ An applicant's weekly after-tax 
straight time pay was to be his regular gross weekly wages 
reduced by the sum of all Federal, State and Municipal taxes 
which would be required to be withheld by the Company from the 
applicant's regular weekly gross wages if employed in the bar-
gaining unit. For those weeks in which the applicant is not 
entitled to unemployment compensation benefits, and such in-
eligibility is not for reasons listed in Article V, Section 2 
(a) of the plan, and provided the applioant had registered for 
unemployment compensation benefits within five days following 
date of lay-off, he was eligible for benefits from the Fund at 
the rate of the wage that he would have received if he were to 
remain at worle Each week for which an applicant received a 
weekly wage from an employer other than the Company he was to 
be paid a weekly benefit equal to the difference between his 
regular gross weekly wages received from the Company and the 
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wage received from other employment, provided that such wages 
are less than the applicant's weekly wage regularly received 
from the Company at the time of lay-off, 
It the employee, after filing an application, is deter-
mined to be eligible for benefits under the Income S~curity 
Plan (Article V), an authorization is forwarded to the Payroll 
Department with instructions to pay the employee the difference 
between the net earnings from Rice-Stix at the time of layoff 
and the present net earnings trom unemployment compensation or 
wages from another employer. A check is then made out by the 
Payroll department and mailed to the eligible employee on the 
Monday following the Friday tor which he or she made applica-
tion tor benetits. 
Disqualifioation - An employee is disqualified for bene-
fits under the Plan if he or she does not meet all the require-
ments as speoified throughout the plan. It was agreed that the 
employee make application for benefits on a weekly basis re-
gardless of whether the employee received wages from another 
employer semi-monthly or monthly. 
Employment - The Personnel Division as part of its func-
tion in processing the claims for benefits also referred em-
ployees laid off under the plan to prospeotive employers. The 
Personnel Division has maintained a close relationship with 
the Missouri State Employment Service 1n obtaining pOSitions 
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for employees under the plan, The Union also was committed to 
help in any way that it could in the placement of laid-off 
workers. 
Computation of Payments Under the Plan - The SUB program 
calls for a guarantee of the net pay of the individual em-
ployee. Since it is the net pay that is guaranteed, it is 
necessary to f1gure the tax upon the net pay, rather than the 
old gross, as usually 1s done with payrolls. 
In the case of an employee who is drawing unemployment 
compensation, it is first necessary to fieure what his net pay 
would have been had he continued work at Rice-Stix. After th1s 
figure 1s derived, the amount of unemployment compensation is 
subtracted from it, leav1ng the amount that is due to the em-
ployee. 
In order to reach a new gross pay, since the contract 
calls for the trusteeship to be liable for any withholding tax 
that is due on these earnings, 1t is necessary to take the net 
pay, subtraot the number of dependents that the employee is 
claiming, multip11ed by $13.00 from the net amount due the em-
ployee, then cont1nue to multiply this answer by 18 percent 
until a zero f1gure i8 reaohed. An example: Suppose an em-
ployee was making $60.00 per week under R1ce-Stix, H1s Soc1al 
Secur1ty tax on that $60.00 would have been $1.35. H1s with-
holding tax if he was claim1ng one dependent, would have been 
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88.46, and City Tax would have been 30¢ (City tax is t of 1 
peroent of gross wage), which would have meant that his net pay 
would have been $~9.89. 
If this employee is drawing unemployment compensation, 
$25.00 would be subtracted if he were receiving maximum compen-
sation, from the $49.39 leaving a total of $24.89, which the 
company would owe him under the plan; but in addition to this 
liability, the Company would also be liable for any taxes 
which the employee might have to pay on this $24.89. To fig-
ure this tax liability, it is necessary to take the $24.89, 
subtract from that $13.00, which is the value of one exemption 
for one week, which would leave $11.89 which the employee is 
receiving on which Rice-Stix incurs a tax liability for that 
employee. To figure the amount of withholding tax which this 
employee would have to pay on this net pay of $11.80 to cover 
any liability he has for such taxes, it is necessary to multi-
ply the $11.89 by 18 percent which is the withholding tax rate. 
The answer to this multiplication is $2.14 but we also have to 
figure 18 percent of the $2.14 because $2.1~ is the net which 
the employee received. The answer to this multiplication is 
38 percent which is an additional 71 of tax liability, and re-
peating the process of multiplying 7¢ by ld percent another 
cent is added. Now adding the $2,14, 38¢ and 7¢ and l¢ you 
arrive at a total of $2.60 which is the amount of taxes that 
39 
the employee would have to pay on a net of $11,89. 
To arrive at the gross amount that is payable to this 
employee, it is necessary to take the $24-.89 that is coming to 
him in net pay, add to that the $2.60, which is the figure 
added for withholding tax, a gross payment of $27.4-9 is paid 
the employee. 
For an employee who has obtained another job, but a job 
that does not pay as much as the wages he was receiving at 
Rice-Stix, the following procedure 1s used:" Example: 
Rice-5tix 
Gross _ ... _.. ... • .. $60.00 
Withholding tax ----- $8.46 
Social Security tax - 1.35 
Ci ty tax - . 0 .30 10.11 
Net Pay ---- 0 ............ --- $4.9.89 
other Employer 
Gross -. " ....... _......, -- $50.00 
Withholding tax ----- $6.60 
Social Security tax - 1.13 
City tax ~------.-.-- ,25 8.Q4 
Net Pay --_ ............ -- $41,96 
Net Pay Rice-Stlx ---- $49.89 
LeSI Net Pay Other - 41 .. 96 
Additional SUB Check - $ 7.93 
Withholding Tax Computation 
Tax at Rice-5Ux --...... 0---- $8.46 
Tax new employer _ ....... - 6.62 
SUB Tn: LiabilitY'M .. . .. $1.80 
SUB now due employee --- $7.93 
Add withholding tax -------- ltiP 
SUB Gross ---------- .. ------ $9.73 
Eligibility (Article V) - An applicant is eligible for a 
,5This method of computation was the one actually used 
The author recognizes that a simultaneous equation would be 
less cumbersome to use. E,g., where t == wi~hholding taxes and 
g == gross income then g - t = $24-. d9 and .18 (g - $13) = t, 
weekly supplemental benefit only if he has been laid off or 
severed from the company's payroll subsequent to the effective 
date of the plan for any reason beyond the employee's control 
and if the applioant: 
1. Has registered within tive days of the date of 
lay-ott and reported to (on at least a weekly basis) an employ-
ment office maintained by the State and the Placement Service 
maintained by the Union and to accept job referrals to or to 
accept and continue in employment deemed suitable under the 
definitions and rulings of the State system. 
2. Has received unemployment compensation benefits 
or was ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits 
only (1) because such week is the first week of the regular 
"waiting period" required to be served under the State Unem-
ployment Compensation system or (2) the applicant did not have 
prior to his layoff, a sufficient period of work covered by 
the State system or (3) because of a limit, under the State 
system of the period of time for Which State unemployment com-
pensation benefits are payable. 
3. Has been employed by the Company or any other 
employer for compensation or remuneration in an amount (gross 
wages) less than the gross weekly wages which the applicant re-
ceived When last employed by the Company and further has pre-
sented the necessary evidence of this fact to the Trustee of 
--
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the Plan. If an employee receives unemployment oompensation 
or wages for a partial week the employee will be paid at a pro-
rated benefit for that week. This benefit will also be paid 
aocording to whether the employee was able and willing to work 
and otherwise eligible according to the plan. 
Duration of Benefits (Article VI) - Benefits will begin 
with the third week after layoff and continue for a maximum 
number of weeks or a maximum number of hours of benefits, not 
to exceed a total of fifty weeks, or a total of two thousand 
hours, whichever is the lesser, within the period of fifty-
two weeks beginning with the date of layoff and limited to the 
expiration date of the plan, or the expiration date ot the 
collective bargaining agreement or any extention, whichever 
oocurs earlier. 
An employee laid off and subsequently recalled to the 
Company's payroll in accordance with the covering seniority 
provisions, who was again laid off at a subsequent date, was 
entitled to the benefits for the maximum period from date last 
laid off and no time or benefits received during previous 
periods of layoffs were charged against the employee. 
Employees who are otherwise eligible to receive benefits 
under the Income Security Plan, but are idled because of a 
strike or a picket line established at the company at which 
they are employed, are entitled to the "insurance tl period of 
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the plan extended by the time lost because of such strike or 
picket line provided that the employee makes written applica-
tion for such extension. 
To remain eligible under the program an applicant must: 
1. Visit the Unemployment Office maintained by the 
State at least on a weekly basis and accept referrals to or 
employment deemed suitable under the system. 
2. Visit the employment office maintained by the 
0nion at least on a weekly basis and accept referrals to or 
employment deemed suitable by the standard of the State Unem-
ployment system. 
3. Visit Rice-Stix and apply for supplemental un-
employment benefits on a weekly basis. 
~. Accept all referrals made by the company to 
other firms known to be employing personnel. 
5. Accept employment offered by any firms referred 
to by the Company, Unemployment Service and Union ofrice if 
, 
deemed suitable under the State system. 
6. Be actively seeking employment on his own ini-
tiative and furnish proof he is actively seeking employmeht, 
7. Report all income whether it be unemployment 
compensation or wages from another employer. Any partial earn-
ings must be reported. 
d. Be available and able to work. 
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9· Receive a weekly income less than that earned 
at Rice-Stix at time of layoff, 
10, Report on a weekly basis No claims may be 
filed on an accumulated basis. 
11. Report any change of employment status" 
12. If idled because of a strike or picket line 
established at the company where presently employed, the em-
ployee must make application for extension of the benefit 
period, in writing, not later than five days following the 
date of such idleness. 
Conditions to Effectiveness of the Plan - Special rulings 
were needed to allow tax deduction for company contributions 
to the fund, and allow integration of the benefits with state 
unemployment benefits, Both of these rulings were obtained 
by the company. 
CHAP1'ER IV 
THE PLAN IN OPERATION 
That the author might study the plan in its actual oper-
ation, three approaches were opened to him. The plan and its 
operation could have been studied through the management and 
its records, through the union and its officials or through 
the workers and their experience. Each method offered limita-
tions and advantages but because the purpose of the study was 
to determine the effect of the plan on the workers involved, 
it was decided to attach the most weight to the workers' 
actual experience. 
Between the period of November 1, 1954 and November 30, 
1956, the date on which the Rice-Stix officials negotiated the 
new Income Security Plan (S. U .B.) with the Teamsters, attrition 
and voluntary "quits" had reduced the work force to 313 work-
ers. The 102 workers who left the company even when included 
under the guarantee did so because they were keenly aware of 
the uncertain position of the Company and therefore were anxious 
to secure steady employment elsewhere. Attrition played an i. 
portant role in reducing the number of workers to 313 since 
each worker remaining constituted a liability to management 
and each worker Who "voluntarily" quit was not, of course, 
4lt 
eligible under the plan. 
There were two sources from which individual information 
concerning these workers was obtained. The first source was 
willingly supplied by the Company officials from personnel 
records. These records furnished information concerning the 
worker's age, job classification, education and duration of 
layoff. Although there was an occasional omission of one or 
the other of the above-mentioned categories, demographic in-
formation on all 316 workers is complete. The second source 
of information was obtained by questionnaire, but the coverage 
was not as universal as that obtained from the personnel 
records. 
Response to the questionnaire was received from 180 of 
the covered workers. This amounted to ,6.6 percent of the 31:3 
total covered workers. The response to this questionnaire was 
divided by mail response and response to personal interview. 
Mail response yielded 49 returns while personal interview 
yielded the remaining 131 returns. The main purpose of the 
questionnaire was to obtain the opinion of the workers regard-
ing the operation of the plan, though information such as dur-
ation of layoff and method of job-placement was also sought. 
The need for the latter information arose because this type 
of information was somewhat incomplete on the personnel cards. 
~6 
I. Personnel Demography 
A. Age 
The average age of the 318 eligible employees was ~7.~ 
years. This is relatively high when compared with the national 
average age of wholesale warehousing personnel which the Bureau 
of Census places at ~O.l years for male personnel and 35.~ 
years for female personnel. 56 The explanation for the high 
average age at Rice-Stix was due generally to a natural decline 
in the wholesale warehousing industry and specifically to Rice-
Stix's unwillingness to introduce technological improvements. 
Such a condition offered neither challenge or future prospects 
of advancement for young workers seeking a career. Older work-
ers, on the other hand, cannot be so independent, for a fair 
job opportunity varies inversely with age. 
TABLE I 
NUMBER OF WORKERS BY SEX AND AGE 
Age 
Sex 
Under 25 25-3lf 35-44 ~5-54 55-6~ 65 and Over 
Male 5 10 36 38 39 5 
Female 5 29 53 66 23 1 
Source: Rice-Stix Personnel Records 
56U. S. Bureau of Census, Q. §. Census of Popuation: 122Q, 
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The male workers at Rice-Stix had an average age of 49.6 
years. This age represents a 9.5 year increase above the aver-
age age for male personnel in the industry on a national scale. 
Only 18 of the 141 male employees were claSSified as clerical 
personnel, the other 123 were semi-skilled operatives. 
TABLE Ia 
JOB CLASSIFICATION BY SEX AND AGE GRODPS 
Age Groups 
Sex Under 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65 and 25 Over 
Opr Clr Opr Clr Opr Clr Opr Clr Opr Clr Opr Clr 
Male 5 0 12 6 30 6 32 6 37 2 5 0 
Female 1 4 4 25 13 40 15 51 0 23 0 1 
Source: Rice-Stix Personnel Records. 
1'he age of female workers did not offer as seriolls an obstacle 
to finding new jobs as it did to male workers. Clerical work-
ers composed 81.3 percent of the total female labor force at 
Rice-Stix, while the average age of all female personnel was 
46.5 years--2.1 years below that of male personnel. In 
Vol. IV Special Re~orts, Part 1 Chapter D, Industrial Char-
acteristics CU. S.overnment Printing Office, Washington, 
D. C., 1955). 
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addition to the advantage of age, the demand for clerical per-
sonnel in St. Louis was good according to the Company and State 
employment offices. Also, 37.5 percent of all female personnel 
were concentrated in the 45-54 age group and some decided, for 
various personal reasons, to leave the labor force entirely 
when laid off. 
TABLE II 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBQ"'I'ION OF WORKERS 
BY AGE GROUPS 
== 
Age Groups Male Female Total 
Jnder 25 3.5 2.8 3·2 
25-34 12.8 16.4 14-.8 
35-44- 25.4- 29.9 28.0 
4-5-54 27.0 37.3 32.7 
55-64 27.7 13, I) 194-
65 and over 3.5 .6 1.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Rice-Stix Personnel Records. 
B. Length of Service 
The average length of service at Rice-Stix reached 12.4-
years for all workers. The male workers averaged a longer job 
tenure with a service of 13.5 years as compared with 11.2 for 
female employees. 
TABLE III 
YEARS OF SENIORITY BY SEX AND AGE 
= 
Male Female 
Age Groups 
0-5 6-10 11-15 16- 0-5 6-10 11-15 16-
---
~Jnder 25 2 3 0 0 4 1 0 0 
25-34 3 9 5 1 9 12 <3 0 
35-44 4 8 11 13 11 14 24 4 
45-54 4 5 10 17 7 7 32 20 
55-64 4 5 13 17 3 2 9 9 
65 and over 0 0 2 3 0 0 1 0 
Source: Rice-Stix Personnel Records. 
Table IV illustrates the percentage distribution of 
service among male as compared to female workers. In a study 
on the characteristics of older workers by the Bureau of Em-
ployment Security, it was found that older workers were more 
stable and held jobs longer than younger workers. 57 More than 
57Bureau of Employment Security, Characteristics and Work 
Experience of Older Unemployed ~orkers (November 1, 195b),----
p. 19. 
TABLE IV 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS 
BY YEARS OF SENIORITY 
Years of 
Seniority 
0-5 
6-10 
11-15 
16 and over 
Total 
Male 
12.1 
21.3 
29.1 
37.5 
100.0 
Female Total 
19.2 16.0 
20.3 20.d 
4.1.8 36.2 
1B.7 27.0 
10:).0 100.0 
Source: Rice-Stix Personnel Records. 
one-half of the older job-seekers had held only one job for the 
past 3 years, compared with one-third of those under 4.5 years 
of age. Thus the average age of 47.5 years and the average 
length of service of 12.4 years does not represent an unusual 
correlation. 
C. Educa tiQI! 
The amount of formal edacation received by the Rice-
St1x personnel 1s 1ndicated 1n Table V. 
Only one in five of the older workers interviewed in the 
. 
sample had completed h1gh school, compared w1th one in three 
of the younger workers employed. At Rice-Stix only one in 9 
~l 
of the older male workers had completed high school, compared 
with one in eight of the female personnel. 
TABLE V 
ED:JCATION OF WORKERS BY SEX AND AGE 
Male Female 
Age Groups Part Part Part Part G.S. H.S. H.S. Col. G.S. H.S. H.S. CoL 
flnder 2, 1 3 1 0 0 1 4 0 
25-34 2 11 4 1 1 8 18 1 
35-44 9 1, 9 3 15 16 1, 4 
45-~ 18 10 5 1 20 27 7 7 
55-64 29 3 2 1 7 8 2 1 
65 and over 4 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Source: Rice-Stix Personnel Records. 
The majority of the male personnel were limited to a grade 
school education while the largest proportion of the female 
personnel were limited to a partial high school education. The 
placement of the laid-off worker at Rice-Stix was a formidable 
task then due to the average age (47.5 years) and the educa-
tional background of its personnel_ 
TABLE VI 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIB"JTION OF WORKERS 
PER EDUCATION CATEGORY 
Male Female Total 
G.S. 47.4 25.3 34.5 
Part H.S. 31.6 40.3 36.1 
H.S. 16·5 26.4 22.9 
Part Col, 4.5 d.o 6.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Rice-Stix Personnel Records. 
D. Duration of Unemployment 
Information concerning the duration of unemployment 
for all Rice-Stix personnel covered by the plan was not avaIl-
able. Of the 141 male personnel information could be obtained 
for only 92, and of the 177 female personnel information was 
forthcoming on only 138. Table VIr represents the numerical 
distribution of male and female personnel upon whom duration-
of-unemployment information was available through Company 
records and questionnaire returns. Rice-Stix personnel cards 
offered 68.6 percent of the information on the 92 male employ-
ees while the remaining 34.4 percent was processed from the 
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questionnaire used in the study. The Company records afforded 
61.d percent of the information on the 138 female employees 
while the remaining 38,2 percent was obtained from the ques-
tionnaire. 
TABLE VIr 
DURATION OF LAYOFF BY AGE AND SEX 
Duration of Male Female 
Layoff 
o-3lt yrs. 35- 0- 3lt yrs. 35-
0 under 1 mo. 7 9 13 41 
1 under 3 mos. 5 23 3 27 
3 mos. and over It 25 2 28 
(Disqualified 6 9 3 18 
n. a. ( (Pension 0 3 0 3 
Source: Questionnaire. 
Only 210 of the 318 eligible employees utilized either 
the benefits or the placement service administered by Rice-
Stlx during the life of the program. Many employees either 
found jobs immediately on their own initiative or would not be 
bothered with the requirements which were set up to establish 
worker eligibility under the SUB program. There would be no 
records available on these employees once they had terminated 
their employment with the company. The "n.a." heading was 
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included in Table VII to account for disqualified and pensIoned 
personnel, to show the reason for their unavailability. 
The thorough studies on older workers by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics over the past few years have pointed up some 
dangerous trends in hiring policy. With the dynamic popula-
tion trends taking place in the United States today, there 
will have to be a serious reappraisal of hiring policies of 
older workers or these workers will become wards of the state. 
In 1900, persons between 45 and 64 numbered nearly lOt 
million, or about 14 percent of the total population. 
By 1955, this age group had increased to nearly 33! 
million, about one-fifth of the total population. 5 
The repercussions of these profound changes in population 
trends must necessarily have their effects on employment trends 
in the U. S. With the steadily increasing life span59 must come 
a steadily increasing utilization of older workers. 
However, many problems both real and imaginary have re-
tarded the effective utilization of these older workers. Such 
imaginary problems as gross exaggeration of older worker's in-
ability to adapt to new jobs, excessive sickness, absenteeism, 
and lack of dexterity and aggressiveness have been alleged. 
58U• S. Department of Labor, Bulletin No. 1213, p. 1. 
59Ibid., P. 31. The average length of life in the U. S. 
reached~6 years by 19542 and increase of over 22 years 
since 1900. The average l1fe expectancy is now 73.6 years for 
women and more than 67 years for men. 
--
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Some real problems do exist such as lack of formal education, 
geographical immobility and social inadaptability. 
Male workers over 45 years of age at Rice-Stix had a dif-
ficult time securing employment in the first month after lay-
off due to the fact that St. Louis was a "labor surplus" area 
early in 1957. The St. Louis Labor Market, a publication of 
the Missouri Division of Employment Security reported that 4.7 
percent of the total labor force in St. Louis as unemployed in 
January 1957 and by ,February 1958 the percentage rose to 8.8 
percent. However, Table VIII shows that a high percentage of 
the workers at Rice-Stix obtained jobs during the first two 
months of lay-off. This is due in part undoubtedly to the 
TABLE VIII 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF DURATION 
OF LAYOFF 
Month Male Female Total 
0 under 1 17.6 39.1 30.6 
1 under 3 30.8 21. 7 25.3 
3 and over 31.9 21. 7 25.8 
D is qualified 16.4 15.2 15.7 
Pension 3.3 2.3 2.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Questionnaire 
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strong pressure exerted by the Rice-Sttx placement service. 
To cut costs the worker was forced to accept the earliest job 
offered, even though it may have been most undesirable. De-
spite these efforts 39.6 percent of the older workers in the 
male category remained unemployed after three months. With 
the average age of ~9.6 years for Rice-Stix male personnel, 
their lack of formal education and the poor condition of the 
St. Louis labor market it is surpriSing that so many older 
workers did eventually find jobs, even with the placement 
pressures of the Company employment service, 
Women personnel fared better than men in securing employ-
ment rapidly. Of the women workers over ~5 years of age, 37.9 
percent obtained jobs within one month of layoff, as compared 
with only 15.9 percent for the men. The reasons for this re-
sult are the advantages that the women held in the important 
categories of age, occupation and education. 
Despite the extenuating circumstances lessening the dura-
tion of unemployment for specific types of workers at Rice-
sttx, once unemployed the older workers experienced greater 
difficulty finding another job. 
II. Method of Job Placement 
By the terms of the Amending Agreement of November 30, 
1956 employees were assigned to three agencies for job place-
ment. The initial job referral was with the Missouri State 
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Placement service to which the employee had to report weekly. 
In addition to the State service, the Rice-Stix dis chargee had 
to report to and accept job referrals deemed suitable by the 
Union and/or the Rice-Stix placement services. 
TABLE IX 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF WOR~ERS 
BY METHOD OF PLACEMENT 
= 
Method of 
Placement 
State 
Union 
Company 
Own efforts 
Total 
Male 
10.8 
1.5 
36.9 
50.8 
100.0 
=; : 
Female 
12.2 
4.1 
22.5 
61.2 
--
100.0 
Source: Questionnaire. 
Total 
11. 7 
3.1 
28.2 
57.0 
100.0 
Information on the method of job placement could only be 
obtained by means of the questionnaire. The Company personnel 
records, although having fairly adequate information as to 
where their employees found jobs, did not distinguish among 
the three services as to which had supplied the job lead. By 
means of the questionnaire the method of placement was able 
to be determined for 163 of the 318 covered employees. 
Of the 138 respondents to the Job-placement question in 
the questionnaire, 6, were male and 9d were female respondents. 
Of the 6, male employees who secured employment, ,0.8 percent 
said it was through their own efforts; 61.3 of the 98 female 
personnel also used the same personal initiative. The Company 
placement service secured jobs for 36.9 percent of men, whereas 
the M1ssouri State and Union placement services placed only 12.3 
of all male respondents. However, the Company serv1ce was not 
as successful in placing female disehargees in new Jobs, for 
it placed only 22.2 percent of the female respondents as com-
pared with 36.9 percent for males. 
Most of the laid-off workers found jobs through their own 
efforts. By doing so they were able to select jobs that were 
more to their liking than. a II suitable" job referral of one of 
the employment agenoies. It also brings out the tenet that 
most workers prefer not to be dependent upon any kind of 
economic seourity program, if of course, they can avoid it. 
Of the three employment servioes, the company, state and 
union in that order, placed the largest number of workers. 
The company placement service was the most successful for 
various reasons. Their primary motivating force was cost, 
Each worker that they were able to place saved them money 
regardless of whether the job was temporary or permanent and 
whether the job was particularly suitable to the individual or 
,9 
not. In addition the company required the greatest minimum 
number of Job referrals for employee per week--five. The State 
service required only three and the union service could not be 
held to a specific number since the number of job referrals 
available to it was sporadic and undeterminable. The company 
also contracted independent employment services throughout the 
city which helped to find work for the laid off employees. 
They also added an employee to their staff whose sole duty it 
was to locate job opportunities in the area. In addition the 
company had the most efficient method of checking whether or 
not the applicant actually sought the job in question and the 
manner in which he sought it. 
The state employment service was somewhat limited because 
of its equal obligation to all laid off workers in the city 
which for a portion of the time in question was declared to be 
a labor surplus area. For various reasons the state system 
was not as efficient as the company in follow-up procedures to 
determine if, and the manner in which, an individual applicant 
applied for a specific job. The State did not do as well in 
placing older workers as might have been expected, Many older 
workers were quick to state that they had to sit and wait most 
of the day for job referrals while younger workers passed them, 
The union was at a special disadvantage with regard to 
placement of workers first because its number of referrals was 
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limited to only those firms who were organized by the Teamsters 
union and among these only those who sought the union's help 
in finding workers, and second because the union, like the 
state service, had an obligation to unemployed workers other 
than those who had been employed by Rice-Stix. 
Even though 25.8 percent of workers were unemployed three 
months or longer two important pOints can be witnessed: (1) the 
duration of unemployment for the workers was certainly reduced 
because of the plan and (2) the incidence of malingering was 
negligible. One important classification of unemployment is 
"frictional unemployment" or the type of unemployment which 
occurs when jobs are available but the worker and/or the 
employer are unable to align themselves with the job oppor-
tunity at the proper time. It is only reasonable then that 
with three services, one of which is motivated by a constant 
cost factor, working together to ~lign wcrkers with jobs and 
vice-versa, the placement success will be greatly enbanced. 
By company statement the number of malingerers did not exceed 
four. The difficulty of malingering is immediately obvious 
when one recalls that an applicant must have been available 
for work and accept from ten to fifteen job referrals a week 
to remain eligible under the plan 
F. Disqualifications 
The Disqualification Table incl~des not only those who 
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were disqualified for some alleged abuse of the SUB regula-
tions, but also those who were individually sought-out for jobS, 
and on refusal to accept, were termed "unavailable" for work, 
This inclusion partially explains the high number of disqual-
ifications in the female ~5-~ age group, Some of the female 
workers decided, you will recall from an early discussion, to 
leave the labor force entirely when laid-off. Others did not 
make this decision known until a job had been offered to them 
and thus drew benefits until that time. 
Sex 
Male 
Female 
TABLE X 
DISQUALIFICATION BY AGE AND SEX 
Age 
TJnder 25 25-3~ 35-4~ 45-54 55-64 65 
1 5 5 2 1 
1 2 6 10 2 
Source: Questionnaire. 
and over 
1 
0 
There was a total of 36 disqualification from the Rice-
Stix SUB plan--2l for women and 15 for men. Sixty-six and 
seven-tenths percent of the disqualified male personnel was 
concentrated in the 25-34 and 35-44 age groups. On the other 
hand, 76.2 percent of the disqualified female personnel be-
longed in the 35-44 and ~5-5~ age group. Of this concentra-
r-----------. 
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tion ~7.6 percent of the female workers disqualified were in 
the 45-~ age group itself. 
TABLE XI 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF DISQUALIFIED 
BY AGE 
Age Male Female Total 
Under 25 6.7 4.8 ,.6 
25-34 33.3 9" 19,4 
35-44 33.3 28 6 30.6 
~5-5l+ 13.3 47.6 33.3 
55-6i+ 6.7 9.5 8.4 
65 and over 6.7 0 2.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Questionnaire. 
Of the persons disqualified under the Plan, the vast 
majority were either not "available" for work or refused 
accept tlsuitable" work. Both of these terms are subject 
to 
to 
administrational flat, and even state employment services with 
all their experience have had a difficult time in setting 
objective standards. The difficult nature of this decision is 
attested to by an expert analyst of unemployment compensation 
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abuses. 
Hard as it is to make that distinction among working 
violators, is doubly hard in the case of non-working 
violators. The state of being "not enough of a worker" 
is extremely complex, The agency finds it hard to state 
clearly even for itself what it means by such require-
ments as that the claimant should have "good cause" for 
leaving a job, or that he should be "available" for work. 
The agency finds60t still harder to convey the meaning to the claimant. 
The same author judges a state employment service to be 
practicing a "severe disqualification policyt! in the following 
example: 
Claimant a woman, referred to a job on night shift in 
plant with inadequate night public transportation and 
in unsafe neighborhood. Was disqualified for refusal to 
work for which reasonably fitted. Claimant testified 
and examiner agreed that company would not hire her 
because of lack of safe transportation for night shift 
workers. Subsequent to job referral, employer amended 
order to eliminate referral of women workers to shift at 
night unless private transportation available. The 
situation was well known to examine6land therefore pre-sumably to ES (employment service). 
By this same standard in an illustration amazingly similar to 
the one above, Rice-Stix could be judged "severe" in its dis-
qualification criterion. A certain woman in the mean age group 
of 45-54 years, who had no personal means of transportation, 
was disqualified for not accepting a position with a firm 
60JoSePh M. Becker, The Problem of Abuse in Unemployment 
Benefits (New York: Columbia ITniverslty Press, '9;3), p, 207. 
61 Ibid., p. 345 
r.....-----------. 
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located approximately 17 miles from her home, Rice-Stix 
having disqualified her, called upon the state service to do 
the same. The state disqualified her but she applied to the 
State arbitration board for a hearing and was consequently 
reinstated with back cheeks, It is worth noting here that 
arbitration was provided by the state and not the arbitration 
prooedure of the Plan. She applied for the state arbitration 
first because under the plan the state was to set the standard 
as to the term "availability." Had the state rejected her 
plea for reinstatement she could have then invoked the arbi-
tration proceedings under Art. VIII, Sec. 4 of the Plan, 
Such things as length of service, duration of unemploy-
ment, distance of the Job from home, local Job market prospects, 
etc., enter into the administrative decisions as to tlavail-
ability" and "suitability." These decisions 'Were anything but 
liberal to the unemployment worker under the guarantee since 
unemployment in the city was high and job opportunities were 
very limited. 
However, beneath these poor area conditions the primary 
cause for exercising severe "suitability" and "availability" 
criteria finds its origin ultimately in cost factors. Rice-
Stix officials 'Were annoyed by the hard line pursued by the 
Teamsters in demanding unmitigated compliance with the sup-
plemental pay plan when the permanent layoff situation clearly 
r 
called tor severance pay. 
The number ot disqualifications was actually quite low, 
and this was due in major part to the policy of attrition and 
voluntary "quitsU followed by the administrators of the Plan. 
Waiting periods for benefits were excessively long, job re-
ferrals were unreasonably numerous, and courtesy was deSignedly 
lacking. 
Although the Plan called for a three-man Board of Arbi-
tration represented by the union, management and public in the 
case of disagreement over disqualifications, this Board was 
never convened. Considering the "severe" disqualification 
criteria it is doubly strange that this Board was never peti-
tioned. Some workers did voice their disapproval to the Team-
sters, but there is no evidence that the Board was ever peti-
tioned to arbitrate. This point will be discussed more fully 
in a later section. 
III. Opinions ot Workers toward Different 
Aspects ot the Plan 
A. !2ward ill!. of dismissal ~ 
By way of the questionnaire 162 workers expressed a 
preference for either supplementary unemployment benefits or 
severance pay. This choice was split evenly 81 for supple-
mental pay and dl for severance pay. 
The company had offered a standard severance pay plan in 
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lieu of the SUB; one wealt f s pay tor every year of service up 
to five years, then a graduated scale of 80 many days' pay for 
each following year of service. The question of SUB and 
severance pay did not come to an actual membership vote, but 
was decided 1n union committee at the time of negotiations. 
The workers de facto fared better by the SUB than they would 
have by a severance pay plan but the latter, according to the 
company officials, would have distributed the monies more 
equitably since it was based on length of service rather than 
duration of layoff. Male employees preferred SUB to severance 
TABLE XII 
WORKERS' PREFERENCE TOWARD TYPE OF DISMISSAL 
PAY BY SEX AND LENGTH OF SERVICE 
Type of Male Female 
Dismissal 0-5 6-10 11-15 0-5 6-10 11-15 Pay 16-yrs. yrs. yrs. yrs. yrs, yrs. 
S.J.B. 5 9 12 13 2 10 22 
Severance 3 7 7 8 9 6 27 
Source: Questionnaire. 
16-
8 
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pay--39 for the former and 25 for the latter. Female employees 
were more inclined toward severance pay, with 56 choosing 
severance pay and 42 supplemental pay. 
For every seniority group the male respondents preferred 
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supplemental pay to severanoe pay_ A progressively greater 
peroentage of all male respondents preferred the supplemental 
pay as their length of servioe and, consequently, their age 
inoreased. Not only was the percentage of supplemental over 
severanoe pay greater in every length-of-service category for 
male employees, but also the peroentage variation inoreased as 
the worker's length of servioe inoreased. 
This preferenoe for SUB over severanoe pay by male workers 
is perfeotly aligned with the seourity aspect of guaranteed pay 
plans. Male workers by natural status have stronger job attach-
ments than women. As they grow older the demand for their 
services varies inversely, while their need for wage seourity 
continues. Consequently, they have a stronger predileotion 
for that economic security devioe which most closely approxi-
mates their weekly or bi-weekly inoome. 
This tendenoy of male workers was brought out distinotly 
duringtbe interviews. Many workers did not know what sever-
ance pay meant, but when the distinotion had been made for 
them between SUB and severance pay the older worker, espe-
cially the males, invariably ohose SUB. They were habituated 
to reoeiving a stipulated wage periodioally and knew enough 
about economic conditions and anxieties during periods of 
unemployment to realize that SUB would better serve their 
position once they were laid-off. Many expressed the fear of 
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squandering a lump-sum severance pay before a new job could be 
secured. 
In opposition to male respondents female workers pre-
ferred severance pay to SUB. The 6 to 10 year length-of-
service category was the only exception to this trend for fe-
male employees. In this group 10.2 percent manifested a pref-
erence for severance pay_ The female respondents, although 
having a definite preterence for severance pay over supple-
mental pay--57.0 percent for severance pay and ~3.0 percent 
for supplemental pay, did not assert their preference as 
strongly as did the male respondents--60.9 percent for supple-
mental pay and 39.1 percent for severance pay. 
The predilection ot female workers in the Rice-Stix situ-
ation tor severance pay is also a normal pattern. The men, 
because of marital obligation, age (mean age ~9.6 years), and 
education (only l6.~ percent had completed high school), needed 
the "social" security of the SUB, whereas the women could 
aftord to be more independent. The female personnel, who were 
more free of familial economio obligations, had a mean age of 
46.5 years and 28.~ percent had completed high school. Also, 
81.1 percent of all female workers possessed clerical Skills, 
for which there was an increasing demand as compared with male 
warehousing operatives, who were less in demand due to the 
decline of the industry. 
Numerically the work force was almost perfectly split on 
the question. Those quickly placed of course preferred sever-
ance pay and also those who felt that the pressure of job re-
ferrals Was too severe. Those who were unable to locate work 
preferred SUB, These are, however, decisions made in retro-
spect and as such do not lend themselves to generalization. 
Given a slightly different set of circumstances, the individ-
ual worker's preference may have changed radically. 
On the basis of the study and the conflicting attitude 
brought out by the question, the work force at Rice-Stix prob-
ably would have preferred a plan similar to the SUB plan of 
the Pittsburgh Glass Company. The Glass plan is really not an 
unemployment insurance plan as was the Income Security plan at 
Rice-Stix. The Glass plan is rather a deferred savings plan 
with vested rights. 62 The plan provided for a minimum security 
account of $600 per employee, but once this amount is reached, 
in-payments do not stop; rather they are earmarked for distri-
bution as vacation pay extras. Up to $600 of the individual 
fund may be used to pay benefits due to lay-off or prolonged 
illness. Each employee retains a vested right to his security 
fund, which he will receive in a lump-sum if he quits, is dis-
missed or retires. 
62Turnbull et al., Economic and Social Securitz, p. 231. 
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Such a plan would have placated most of the major com-
plaints of the Rice-Stix employees. It would retain some 
relationship of benefits to length-of-service yet afford a 
degree of protection for the individual employee from the 
economic insecurity due to either temporary or permanent lay-
off. 
IV. Workers' Opinion of Administration of the Plan 
In reply to the oplnion-toward-administration question, 
165 Rice-Stix workers expressed a response, Of this number 
99 were female and 66 were males. 
'lIABLE XIII 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS' OPINION 
OF ADMINISTRATION OF S.U.B. 
ia 
Opinion Male Female Total 
Favorable 59.1 58.6 ,3.8 
Favorable with reservations 22.7 25,3 24-.2 
Unfavorable 9.1 9.1 9.1 
No answer 9.1 7·0 7.9 
Total 100.0 100 .. 0 100.0 
Source: Questionnaire. 
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The wide variety of expression which this question pre-
cipitated made it difficult to process the responses under 
general categories without losing objectivity_ After careful 
study of the responses to the questionnaire the four categories 
listed in Table XIII were thought to be the best for express-
ing the worker's true opinion toward the administration of the 
SUB plan. The category "favorable with reservations," was 
adopted to cover an opinion in whioh the employee was generally 
favorable to the plan but explicitly mentioned a complaint 
which particularly impressed him or her. The category Itno 
answer tt was deemed necessary to cover those employees who ex-
plicitly refused to make a judgment concerning the plan or its 
administration. The category, uUnf'avorable tf included those 
respondents who expressed with varying degrees of emphasis 
both their general and particular dislike of the plan. 
The "favorable u category included 53.8 percent of all 
respondents. While the SryB plan was still in effect, prior to 
February 28, 195d, no questionnaire was given to the eligible 
Rice-Stix personnel for fear that their response would be 
biased. If the respondent thought that his answer expressing 
an unfavorable opinion toward the Plan and its administration 
would have jeopardized his eligibility, he would have answered 
under duress. To avoid this possibility the questionnaire was 
run-off only after an employee had exhausted his benefits or, 
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where this was impossible to be certain of, after the expira-
tion date of the plan in February, 19,a. 
i'he 66 male respondents expressed a ,9.1 percent "favor-
able" opinion response towards the administration of the SUB 
plan. The female respondents, however, were slight11 below 
the males in their "favorable" opinion with 5'8.6 percent. This 
is typical when Table XIII is compared with Table XII, because 
the male respondents expressed 60.9 percent preference for SUB 
over severance pay, while female respondents on the other hand 
expressed '7.2 percent for severance pay over SUE. 
In the "favorable with reservation" category the female 
respondents had more complaints with the administration than 
did the male respondents. Twenty-five and two-tenths percent 
of the female respondents explicitly mentioned a complaint 
while 22.7 percent of the males were explicit. 
The largest single group of workers expressed a favorable 
opinion toward the administration of the plan yet some of 
these found a job in a very short period of time and thus did 
not have much experience under the plan. The second largest 
group were those expressing a "favorable with reservation" 
opinion. The most reiterated complaint was delivered against 
the personnel man brought in for the express purpose of plac-
ing the dischargees expeditiously and cheaply. This individual 
was referred to as a "hatchet man," which, abstracting from 
--
his personality and concentrating on his duties, he was in 
many ways. Many and varied reasons tor disliking the admin-
istration follow upon this principal complaint, Some telt 
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that they should not have to report in person each week for 
benef1ts but that their cheeks should have been mailed to them 
each week. Others felt that they had to wait too long at in-
convenient reporting times; that 10 to l~ job referrals a week 
was excessive since many of these were unreasonable leads; that 
applicants were treated like ttcharity cases"; and that it was 
unfair to require those with jobs to report in person each 
week 
One individual observed that a company could pay a former 
Rice-Stix employee a lower wage knowing that Rlce-Stix would 
supplement it. Others contended that continued membership in 
the Teamster's Union made it difficult to obtain work with 
some prospective employers. 
In general, the "favorable with reservations" and "un_ 
favorable" categories were the result of two oppOSing views 
meeting head-on. The worker desired benefits and interpreted 
the plan in such a way as to best accomplish this goal. The 
Company desired to cut the cost of the plan and thus admin-
istered it in such a way as to do just that whenever possible. 
The Company, making it difficult to collect benefits, sought 
to reduce cost via attrition. 
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There was a general lack of mutual trust between the 
workers and the administrators of the Stffi plan at Rice-Stix. 
The administration failed to realize that the vast majority of 
workers were earnestly seeking a good job and not merely living 
off the 100 percent guarantee provided by the contrnct. Some 
workers, on the other hand, failed to realize that the plan 
was a device for insuring a steady income during job-seeking 
and not a one-year vacation plan. 
Considering the adaptation which was necessary to admin-
ister a severance situation by means of a SUB administrative 
procedure, the best placement results were probably obtained 
by the Rice-Stix placement agency_ 
v. Cost of the SUB 
The total possible cost of the original GAW was certainly 
known to the Company. It was simply the average hourly wage 
times 2,080 hours times the number of covered employees. The 
actual cost of a G.A.W. plan is always an unknown in actual 
monetary figures at the time of negotiations. The key to 
future proliferation of the guaranteed annual wage plan--
whether in the form of SUB or GAW--depends on setting specific 
limitations to an employer's liability The Latimer Report is 
quick to realize this fact in its summary remarks. 
The experience with g~aranteed wage plans has not 
afforded any substantial evidence as to what a plan 
with specified provisions might cost over a period of 
time. An employer who guarantees wages undertakes an 
obligation to pay the amount guaranteed regardless of 
whether he has enough work to cover the guarantee. A 
guarantee is self-defeating if it involves an employer 
in additional costs to the point where his ability to 
pay becomes unduly limited,03 
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Any form of guaranteed wage plan will, to the extent 
toward which an employer commits himself, have compensating 
benefits. First, it should reduce labor turnover and there-
fore the cost of hiring and training new workers. Secondly, 
higher productivity would probably result from the mere bouy-
ancy effects of a greater degree of individual economic se-
curity. Thirdly, the cost of stabilizing labor requirements 
could possibly be reduced. The Report concludes that these 
factors will surely decrease the absolute cost ot wage guaran-
tees assumed by employers. 
This cost consideration of GAW obligations was certainly 
thought of when the Rice-Stix management assumed the respon-
sibility in 1953. It must be remembered that the 'I'eamsters 
included the GAW in their five-year contracts for the purpose 
of giving their members a minimum of security in an unstable 
industry. However, the salutary effects of employment security 
and increased productivity were relegated to the background 
once the R1ce-Stix operation became the bait for the proxy 
63 Latimer, 22. 9+t ., p. 13, 
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fight. The new owners were not interested in stable working 
conditions, but merely in utilizing the lucrative facets of 
Rice-Stix and discontinuing the rest of the operation The 
decision to liquidate the warehousing operation presented only 
one cost problem pertinent to the GAW--how can the contractual 
obligation be discharged at the least expense to the owners? 
Due to the Teamster's refusal to accept severance pay, 
the owners were forced to discharge their obligation over a 
61 week period. Actual benefits to workers amounted to 
$238,092.1, over this period with $77,391.38 added for pension 
and health plan benefits. (See Appendix D.) This cost was a 
considerable liability, but there was no record of management 
re1uctanoe to aooept the obligation in 1953. Onoe the provi-
sion of the oontract was in foree, concession to or mitigation 
of the Company's liability was entirely at the Union's dis-
cretion. Almost certainly the Union's choice of SUB over a 
lump-sum severance plan increased the actual labor cost of the 
new owners in their liquidation of the St. Louis warehousing 
operation of Rice-Stix. 
CHAPTEH V 
CONCLUSION 
Since Walter Ruether and the United Automobile Workers 
negotiated their Supplemental Unemployment Benefits Plan in 
19", a torrent of argumentation and discussion has appeared 
from management and union sources as well as from ttneutrals. n 
It has been charged that these plans create a duplicate un-
employment system, that they reduce worker incentive, reduce 
labor mobility and create unbearable financial burdens espe-
cially for the average and small sized firm. Unions also have 
had their problems with the SUB. Primary among their problems 
have been the senior union member who would prefer to have the 
extra money in his pay envelope rather than in an SUB fund 
which he feels is set-up primarily to aid employees with less 
seniority. 
This Rice-Stix study alone does not lend itself to con-
clusive answers to any of the above problems even though it is 
more applicable to some than to others. The study was de-
signed to determine the effect of this particular SUB plan on 
a specific group of workers in a certain situation of perma-
nent lay-ofr As such the observations and conclusions reflect 
a specific study with a specific set of circumstances and thus 
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will be validly applied to future plans only if the future 
circumstances are comparable. 
7d 
The important conclusions may be brought out by examining 
the pivotal parts of the plan in the light of the expressed 
view of the worker and the statistical data compiled. 
'I'ri-Partite Placement of Workers - This feature of the 
plan did not represent a wasteful duplication of administra-
tion and resources as has been charged but rather a much needed 
supplementation. Rice-St1x's workers found jobs that would 
not have been listed with the State Employment Service and they 
found jobs relatively fast when it is recalled that the area 
was declared a "labor surplus" area. 
The important claSSification of frictional unemployment 
was lessened through the efforts of the three agencies working 
together aligning workers with employers and vice-versa more 
quickly than would have been the case'had the State service 
been working alone. 
Malingering - Critics of the SUB early declared that such 
plans would destroy the workers' incentive: "If I can collect 
100 percent benefits while idle why should I seek work at all 
during the period of the guarantee?" 
It is here that We think this study has a definite contri-
bution to make. Up to this point the question has been mostly 
academic since there has been no real evidence to substantiate 
one view or the other. 
In the Rice-Stix situation the incidence of malingering 
was negligible. As was pointed out earlier, Company admin-
istrators of the plan declared that not more than four cases 
of malingering could be found. Another important point was 
also brought out earlier, namely, that the majority of the 
workers found jobs through their own efforts. 
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The reasons for this record are many--the methods of the 
Company and State services to thwart abuses and the fact ex-
pressed by the workers that they were better satisfied with 
jobs that they personally seleoted. But whatever the reasons 
the fact remains that of all the workers inoluded in the 
guarantee, only four were classified by the employer as 
malingerers. 
Cost of the SUB - When Rice-Stix negotiated the GAW in 
19,3 covering ~20 of their employees there was little evidence 
to lead them to believe that the guarantee would ever be used. 
Later it was invoked and eventually the company did go out of 
business. On the basis of this study however, it can honestly 
be said that the two events did not represent a cause-effect 
relationship. As was shown in Appendix B, the Company had the 
ability to pay and the firm was liquidated by Safie Bros., in 
spite of the cost of the SUB and liquidated at a sizeable 
profit. 
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Preference of SDB over Severance Pay - Probably because 
of the lack of job-security in the industry and company with 
which they were associated and the general conditions of the 
St. Louis labor market, the majority of the workers, with an 
average length of service of 12.4 years, preferred SUB to the 
severance pay plan offered by the Company. 
The situation in which this preference was aired can 
hardly be called typical however, and as such, the preference 
does not lend itself to generalization. 
Summary - The increasing fear of job-insecurity which 
grips the 20th century industrial worker is bound to increase 
the importance of private plans to supplement unemployment 
benefits" Sweeping industry-wide decisions can arbitrarily 
jeopardize the jobs of thousands. of workers, causing untold 
misery to many more thousands of persons who directly dependent 
upon the worker IS weel-cly pay oheck. 
If the private approach to eoonomic security does not 
keep pace with modern industrial ooncentration, the governmental 
approach of unemployment compensation will have to be vastly 
extended. With the inherent fear of nSocialism" so strong in 
the United States, the most natural solution to economic in-
security seems to rest in the private union-management approach, 
The fundamental importance of private unemployment insuranoe 
to our free society demands that all private institutions 
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concerned work diligently to extend its application as widely 
as possible. 
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APPENDIX I 
SUMMARY OF GUARANTEED ANNUAL WAGE PUNS 
IN TEAMSTERS LOCAL 688 CONTRACfS 
No. of 
Total Total Area of Guaranteed Emplys. Effective 
Company or Industry <ltd. Emplys. Annual Wage Covered Date of 
GrQUR Houri in Unit CavU.S, by Plan Plap 
Crown Cork Specialty 2,000 233 1st 160 employees 160 3/1/53 
on senior! t.y 
roster 
Brown Shoe Co. 2,000 400 All employees on 385 11/15/52 
payroll as of 
n/l/52 
Rice-Stix Dry Goods 2,000 660 1st 420 employees 420 3/1/53 
on seni0X'1ty 
roster 
Wool Shoe Co. 2,000 114 ht 50% 01 employ- 100 5/1/53 
ee. on seniority 
roster 
Cabinet Industry (6) 2,000 36 1 st 50% of employ- 17 5/1/53 
ees on seniority 
roster 
So-Good Potato Chip 2,000 14 1st 8 employees on a 4/25/53 
seniority roster 
Puro Co. 2,000 100 35 employees 5/6/53 
Jan. thru May 
25 employees 
June thru Aug. 
15 employees 
Sept. thru Dec. 
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No. of 
Total Total Area of Guaranteed Emplys. Effective 
Company or Industry Gtd~ Emply". AMual Wage Covered Date of 
q,p,yp Hqyts 10 Unit COYlt'ge bX Phn Pl'n 
NOtthwestern Cooperage 2,000 60 1st 35 employees 35 5/23/53 
on seniority 
toster 
Shapleigh Hardware Co. 2,000 869 1 It 6~ of employ- 531 6/1/~ 
ees on seniority 
roster 
Handl1fl9, Inc. 2,000 20S 1st 130 employees 130 6/1/53 
on seniority 
roster 
Kearney Electric 2,000 236 1st 140 employees 140 4/11/53 
on seniority 
roster 
A. S. Aloe Co. 2,000 80 ht 6~ of employ- 54 10/1/53 
ees on seniority 
roster 
Brooks Paper Co. 2,000 90 1st 5Q% of employ- 40 11/16/53 
ees Oft senIority 
roster 
Bond Clothing Co. 2,000 35 N.aintenance of 2/27/52 
basic crew of 2!J 
employees 
Breuchman Cooperage 2,000 6 1st 50% of emp1oy- 3 11/26/57 
eea on seniority 
roster 
Handland, Inc. 2,000 2 1 5/1/54 
Drug-itaster 2,000 34 1st 5<'* of employ- 17 5/1/54 
ees on seniority 
roster 
Act Haase (Pro.) 1,800 60 lst 4qi6 of employ- 24 7/ll'M> 
ees on seniOl'ity 
roster. 
- ------ ---
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No. of 
Total Total Area of Guaranteed Emply •• Effective 
Company or Industry Gtd. Emplys. Annual Wage Covered Date of 
~QYP Hours in unu S(QYerage by elln Plan 
Fruit and Produce 2,000 350 lst 25% of emplO1- 87 1/15/55 
eea on seniority 
roster 
Louis Maull Co. 2,000 19 1st 10 employees 10 4/']!!)f5#, 
on seniority 
roster 
Marthwest Bottle 2,000 14 1st 6 on seniority 6 6/27/54 
roster 
A & L Cigarette 2,000 5 lst 5 employees on 5/24/54 
seniority roster 
H. J. Heinz Co. 2,000 7 1st 4 employees on 4 11/14/53 
seniority roster 
Cold Storag. Whses. 2,000 126 1st 50% of employ- 63 9/15/M 
ees on seniority 
roster 
Aaron ferer & Sons 2,000 17 1st 10 employees 10 8/22/54 
on seniority 
roster 
Hutting Sash & Door 2,000 26 1st 14 employees 14 12/31/54 
on seniority 
roster 
Buxton-Sklnner Co. 2,000 8 1st 6at of emp1oy- 2/13/54 
ees on seniority 
roster 
Professional Spec. 2,000 32 1st 17 employees 17 7/4/'J3 
on seniority 
roster 
Public Warehouses (9) 2,000 170 1st 90 employees 200 9/1/53 
on roster of 9 
firms 
American Metal Bar. 2,000 11 1st 4 employees on 4 8/16/53 
seniority roster 
..., 
ad 
No. of 
Total Total Area of Guaranteed Emplys. Effective 
Company or Industry Gtd, Emplys. Annual Wage Covered Date of 
GrQYP Ho,yrs 10 ynU &cw;rage by Plan Plin 
Butler Bros. 2,000 100 lst 6~ of employ- 60 6/1/55 
eea on seniority 
roster 
American Sheet & Strip 2,000 17 lst 10 employees 10 9/15/53 
on seniority 
roster 
Sears-Roebuck Co. 2,000 52 1st 60% of employ- 31 5/31/53 
ees on roster 
(verbal) 
Witte Hdwe. Co. 2,000 90 lit 6(U of emp1oy- 54 6/1/55 
ees on seniority 
roster 
Hampton Elec. 2,000 5 1st 3 employees on 3 9/20/53 
seniority roster 
A. J. Childs 2,000 17 lst 11 employees 11 4/1~3 
on seniority 
roster 
Adam Hat Co. 2,000 7 All current employ- 7 12/31/52 
ees on Nat'1. 
agreement 
Grocer Industry 2,000 25 1st bc:t' of employ- 15 10/14/53 
(non-ass'o. firms) aes on seniority 
roster 
ACL Haase (whse.) 2,000 20 1st 60% of emp1oy- 12 10/14/53 
ees on seniority 
roster 
Heifetz Pickle Co. 2,000 30 1st 15 employees 15 11/1/54 
on seniority 
roster 
Grocery Industry Assn. 2,000 390 1st 193 employees 193 10/14/53 
(14) on roster of 14 
firms 
No. of 
Total Total Area of Guaranteed Emplys. Effective 
Company or Industry 
Group 
Gtd. Emplys. Annual Wage Covered Date of 
HOUts in Unit Cqxerage by PIa a Plan 
Grocery Industry Office 2,000 140 1st 50% of employ-
ees on seniority 
roster 
70 10/14/53 
APPENDIX II 
BALANCE SHEET* - RICS-STIX, INC. 
NOVEMBER 30, 1953 
Current Assets CUrrent Llabi1itie, 
Cash $ 2,030,872 Notes payable, hanks $ 4,500,000 
Accounts Receivable Accounts payable 933,939 
(net) 9,105,966 Accruals 1,097,052 
Inventorie, 19.:Z22.Q.Z;2 Income tax reserve ~;a.Q2B 
TUal eun@nt Total Cyfren,t 
Asst:ta $21,928,911 LiabllUits $ 6,624,019 
Qtblf Asse:tt §baXlb21dlll' ~gW~:t¥ 
Investments and 7% 1st preferred 
advances to sub- par $100 1,622,600 
ddt.ries, cost 1,874,&0 7% 2nd preferred 
Other investments 444,691 par 1100 1,918,600 
Common stock no par 3,401,430 
floeartX, Plan:t ~ Reserve general 
IClUlipmtnt conting.nciea 3,000,000 
Net property 2,01:),800 Earned aurplus 2t~:z.:a98 
IGB1 Aasets $26,264,247 Iqt.l Li,bilitiea 126,264,247 
Net Income as a percentage of Capital Investment (including con-
tingency reserves and earned surplus, but excluding income tax 
reserves), of Riee-Stix, Inc. computed from Company to, records.** 
1944 - 12.5 
19<0 - 8.7 
1946 - 19.5 
1947 - 16.5 
1948 - 12.5 
1949 - 5.8 
1953 - 2.7 
1954 - 3.4 
* Standard and Poor, "QrPR,tiQD ReSCotdl. 
** Rice-Stix financial records. 
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19$0 - 8.8 
1951 - 5.1 
1~2 - 3.5 
APPENDIX III 
A RAIDER GETS ROUTED 
(Fortune, October, 19,5, p. 177.) 
One of the most colorful and complicated of recent raid-
ing operations reached a startling denouement on August 26. 
The raid was on Rice-Stix, Inc., of St. Louis, a big whole-
saler and manufacturer of dresses, shirts, and other apparel, 
and it really began back in 1953. At that time textile oper-
ator M. M. Clairmont, with his tvo associates in Brandon Trad-
ing Corp., Adolph Marcus and Avram Goldstein, obtained control 
of Reliance Manufacturing with an investment of some $3 million. 
Using Reliance Funds, Clairmont began quietly buying up Rice-
Stix common stock at $25 to $30 a share (VI. Rice-Bttx net 
quick assets ot $51 a share). 
When Clairmont had bought up about 50,000 of Rice-Stix's 
227,000 shares of common, he made a tender offer of $42 a 
share for 75,000 shares. At this point in November, 19~, 
Satie of Batie Bros., New York textile manufacturer, also 
started buying Rice-Bttx shares. Satie had been eyeing Rice-
Stlx for along time but had been told the controlling stock-
holders would not sell. By mid-December. 1954, Safie had 
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offered $50 a share and thought he had sewed up a 26,Ooo-share 
block owned by E. W. Sttx, Sr., F. B. Eiseman (sons of two 
original partners), and their immediate families, But Clair-
mont was ahead of him and got the block for $46 a share. The 
same day Satie did pick up 30,000 shares for $50 a share. In 
the last ditoh try, on Naw Year's Eve, Satie telegraphed to 
the Rice-Stix Board a $65-a-share offer for 72,000 treasury 
shares. The Board, not needing oapital and apparently fearing 
legal entanglements, turned down the offer. 
By February, 1955, Clairmont owned 52 percent at the 
Rice~Stix voting shares (the Rice-Stix 7 percent non-callable 
preferred stock also had voting rights, and Safie and Clair-
mont bid its price up from $105 to $150). Clairmont acquired 
his oommon at an average price of $48 a share. Safie, who 
owned ~O percent of the voting shares, acquired his common at 
an average price ot $52 a share~ Each man had put up about $7 
million, but Clairmont had control. There seemed no doubt 
that Clairmont had won. 
But Joe Safie never gave up trying. He'd wanted Rice-
Stix for a long time; the company had a wonderful name in the 
trade; he needed it as a domestic market for the textiles he 
had his three brothers turned out in their North Carolina mill 
(they also own mills in El Salvador and Trinidad), He had 
tried raiding and since that had failed he turned to negotia-
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tion. The simplest way was to offer to buy out Clairmont's 
majority interest in Rice-Stix, which he did, repeatedly. 
Clairmont not only refused to sell but talked of trying to buy 
out Safie's minority interest. 
Safie turned back to the beginning of the whole compli-
cated deal, back through Reliance to Brandon Trading, the hold-
ing company that controlled Reliance and therefore, in turn, 
Rice-Stix. He persuaded Clairmont's two chief associates in 
Brandon Trading, Marcus and Goldstein, to work on Clairmont to 
sell them his interest in Brandon. Since his partners refused 
to back him in buying Safie's minority interest, Clairmont 
finally agreed to sellout to them. It didn't take Marcus and 
Goldstein long to turn around and sell Brandon. Trading to Safie 
for $d million, which was more than double their original in-
vestment, This of course, also gave the Safies control of 
Reliance and Rice-Stix. So the Safies now have the textile 
outlets they wanted. Mr. Clairmont is out of the textile 
bUSiness, at least for the moment, but still in the chips. 
APPENDIX IV 
AMENDING AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into this 30th day of 
November, 1956, by and between RICE-STIX, INC. (hereinafter 
referred to as the Company) and the WAREHOUSE AND DISTRIBUTION 
WORKERS' UNION, Local No. 688, affiliated with the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and 
Helpers of America, A.F. of L., - C.I.C. (hereinafter referred 
to as the Union). 
WITNESSETH: 
Whereas, the above parties have heretofore entered into a 
collective bargaining agreement on March 20, 1953, and an 
amending agreement dated June 27, 1956, covering the Company's 
warehouse, maintenance and office employees in St. Louis, 
Missouri, as defined in Article I of said agreement of March 20, 
1953, as amended, and 
Whereas, the above parties deem it necessary to make oer-
tain changes 1n the said colleotive bargaining agreement of 
March 20, 1953, as amended, 
NOW THEREFORE, in oonsideration of the premises and 
mutual promises herein oontained, the parties agree as follows: 
95 
I. 
Effective as of the date all details prerequisite to the 
effectiveness of the following plan have been accomplished, 
the said collective bargaining agreement of March 20, 1953, as 
amended, shall be amended by striking therefrom Section 2 of 
Article III ( titled "Guaranteed Annual Wage") and substituting 
therefor the following torm of supplemental unemployment bene-
fit program to be known as the Income Security Plan, 
ARTICLE 1- Establishment of Plan 
The company shall establish, subject to the favorable 
ruling of the Missouri DiviSion of Employment security, an 
Income Security Plan for all of the hourly paid employees in 
the bargaining unit as of the effective date of this Plan and 
shall pay all expenses incident to the operation and manage-
ment of the Plan for the duration of said collective bargaining 
agreement of March 20, 1953, as amended, except as otherwise 
provided in, and subject to the terms of this Plan. The Pur-
pose of the Plan shall be to provide an Income Security Fund 
from which 
1. An employee who is laid off or severed from the 
Company's payroll for any reason beyond the employee's 
control, except for failure or refusal of the employee 
to work or tor discharge for cause or for military 
leave, or for mutually agreed upon leave of absence, 
--
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or for reason of retirement, may draw from the fund 
for a specified period, stipulated weekly amounts to 
supplement State Unemployment Compensation benefits 
or to supplement earnings from other employment which 
are less than the employee's earnings received at time 
of layoff. 
ARTICLE II. Eligibility ~ Participate 
Each employee of the bargaining unit on the Company's pay-
roll and on the seniority list as of the effective date of this 
Plan shall be eligible to participate in the Plan. 
ARTICLE III. Inco!!! Security Fund 
The Company shall establish an Income Security Fund in 
accordance with this Income Security Plan and shall appoint a 
trustee who shall be the Treasurer of the Com-
Section 1. 
paoy, to carry out the provisions of this Plan. 
All contributions by the Company for the eligible employees, 
as set forth in Seetions 3 and ~, the securities purchased 
there with, and the earnings derived therefrom, shall be 
credited to the Income Security Fund. 
In the event that the Plan shall be terminated in accord-
ance with its terms prior to the expiration of the above agree-
Section 2. ment or terminate with the said agreement, the 
Company's obligation to contribute to the Fund 
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shall cease entirely. The moneys remaining in the Fund upon 
termination of the Plan or the agreement, shall be paid to the 
Unity Welfare Association Pension Trust Fund as defined in 
Article XIV of said collective bargaining agreement ot March 
20, 1953, as amended, and the Company's regular contribution 
to said Unity Welfare Association Pension Trust Fund credited 
for the amount so deposited. 
For the purpose of this Section, failure to obtain the 
favorable rulings re: the deductibility of the contributions 
to the income Security Fund as a deductible expense under the 
Internal Revenue Code as now in effect, or as may be hereafter 
in effect or under any other applicable federal income tax law, 
and a failure to obtain the favorable ruling of the Missouri 
Division of Employment Security, shall be deemed to be a termi-
nation of the Plan. 
The Company shall contribute to the Income Security Fund 
effective with the dates shown below, a sum equal to the per-
Sectlon 3. centages as listed of the annual wages of those 
hourly rated employees of the bargaining unit 
employed as of the effective date of this Plan. 
Amount 
l~ 
Dates of qontribution 
Effective date of plan 
The contribution to said fund as of January 1, 1957 shall not 
be less than a total of l~ of the annual wages of those hourly 
rated employees of the bargaining unit employed as of the 
effective date of this plan. Subsequent contributions shall 
be determined by actuarial valuation. Said fund shall be de-
posited 1n a qualified bank. Benefits shall be payable only 
from such funds. 
Investment of Income Security Fund. (a) The moneys in 
the Income Security Fund shall be invested in United states 
Section 4. 
Government Bonds or other equivalent securities 
which are approved from the investment of trust 
funds; (b) Earnings from the Income Security Fund shall be 
oredited to the fund. 
ARTICLE'±y. Weekly Payments from IncoDl! §!9UX i tl Fund 
An employee who is eligible under the plan shall be paid 
for each week (as defined in the plan) during which the em-
Sect10n 1. 
ployee is unemployed, beginning with the third 
week subsequent to the date of layoff and end-
ing with the 52nd week following date of lay-off, or the date 
of termination of this plan, or the date of termination of the 
collective bargaining agreement or any extension thereof, 
whichever occurs earlier. 
Amount of Applicant's Weekly Benefit: (A) With respect to 
each week for which an applicant receives or is entitled to 
Section 2. 
receive any unemployment compensation benefits, 
the applicant Shall be paid a weekly benefit in 
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an amount which when added to the applicant's state benefit 
for such week, will be equal to 100% of the applicant's weekly 
after-tax straight time pay, except as hereinafter adjusted. 
For purposes of this subsection (a), an applicant's weekly 
after-tax straight time pay shall be his regular gross weekly 
wages reduced by the sum of all Federal, State and Municipal 
taxes which would be required to be colleoted, deducted, or 
withheld by the Company from the applicant's regular gross 
weekly wages if regularly employed in the bargaining unit, (b) 
with respect to those weeks for which the applicant laid is 
not entitled to unemployment compensation benefits and such 
ineligibility is not for reasons listed in Article V, Section 
2 (a) of this plan, and provided the applicant shall have 
registered for unemployment compensation benefits within five 
(5) days following date of layoff, the applicant shall be paid 
benefits from the Fund at the rate of the wages that he would 
have received if he were to have remained at work, reduced by 
the sum of all Federal, State, and Municipal taxes which would 
be required to be collected, deducted or withheld by the Com-
pany from the applicant's regular gross weekly wages if regu-
larly employed in the bargaining unit, (c) with respect to 
each week for which an applioant receives a weekly wage from 
an employer other than the Company, the applicant shall be 
paid a weekly benefit which is equal to the difference between 
100 
the applicant's regular gross weekly wages received from the 
Company reduced by the sum of all Federal, state and Munici-, . 
pal taxes which would be required to be collected, deducted or 
withheld by the Company from the applicant's regular gross 
weekly wages if regularly employed in the bargaining unit, and 
the applicant's gross weekly wages received from other employ-
ment, reduced by the sum of all Federal, State and Municipal 
taxes Which would be required to be collected, deducted or 
withheld from the regular gross weekly wages received trom 
other employment, provided that such weekly wages are less 
than the applicant's weekly wage regularly received from the 
Company at time of layoff; (B) The applicant's weekly benefit, 
as defined 1n paragraph (A) above, sub-paragraph (a) through 
(c), shall be adjusted and increased so as to include an amount 
equal to the sum of all Federal, State and Municipal taxes or 
other charges attributable to the applicant's receipt of bene-
fits hereunder; however, the amount thereof shall be retained 
by the trustee and transmitted (not less than quarterly) for 
and on the applicant's behalf, to the appropriate governmental 
agency (whether or not the withholding of same by the trustees 
be required by law). 
Allocation of Weekly Wages and Unemployment Compensation 
Benefits to Partial Weeks: If an employee received unemploy-
Section 3. ment compensation benefits or gross wages from 
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other employment for a partial calendar week, the unemployment 
compensation benefits or the gross wages shall be prorated over 
each day of the period for which such unemployment compensation 
benefits or gross wages were paid in order to determine what 
portion thereof applies to the week for which payments under 
this Plan are to be made. 
Withholding by the Trustee: There shall be deducted by 
the Trustee from the amount of any benefits otherwise payable 
Section 4. 
pursuant to this plan, any amount required to be 
withheld by reason of authorized union dues 
deductions and insurance premiums being normally and regularly 
deducted by the Company immediately prior to layoff, provided 
that the authority for such deductions has not been withdrawn 
by the applicant 
ARTICLE y. Eligibility for Benefits 
An employee shall be eligible for weekly supplemental 
benefits from the income security Fund when he shall have made 
Section 1. 
application therefor in accordance with tbe pro-
cedure established hereunder and shall have met 
the requirements of Section 2 of this Article. 
Eligibility: An applicant shall be eligible for a weekly 
supplemental benefit only if he shall have been laid off or 
Section 2. 
severed from the Company's payroll subsequent 
to the effective date of this plan for any 
, 
r---------------------------------------------------------------~ , 
reason beyond the employee's control and 
(a) if such layoff or severance 
(1) was not for failure or refusal of the employee 
to work 
(2) was not tor reason of discharge for cause 
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(3) was not for military leave or for mutually agreed 
upon leave of absence or for reason of retirement 
(b) if with respect to such week, the applicant 
(1) has registered at and reported to (on at least a 
weekly basis) an employment Office maintained by 
the state and the Placement Service maintained by 
the Union and to accept job referrals to or to 
accept and continue in employment deemed suitable 
under the definitions and rulings of the state 
system. 
(2) has received unemployment compensation benefits 
or was ineligible to receive unemployment compen-
sation benefits only (i) because such week is the 
first week of the regular "waiting period" required 
to be served under State unemployment compensation 
system or (il) the applicant did not have prior to 
his layoff, a sufficient period of work covered by 
the State system or (iii) because of a limit, under 
the State system of the period of time tor which 
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State unemployment compensation benefits are pay-
able. 
(3) has been employed by the Company or any other 
employer for compensation or remuneration in an 
amount (gross wage) less than the gross weekly 
wages which the applicant received when last em-
ployed by the Company and further has presented 
the necessary evidence of this fact to the Trustee 
of this Plan. 
ARTICLE VI. Duration g! Benefits 
(a) An eligible employee (Article V) shall be entitled to 
receive a maximum number of weeks or a maximum number of hours 
Section 1. 
of benefits, not to exceed a total of fifty (,0) 
weeks, or a total of two thousand (2,000) hours, 
whichever is the lesser, within the period of fifty-two (,2) 
weeks beginning with the date of layoff and limited to the ex-
piration date of this plan, or the expiration date of said col-
lective bargaining agreement or any extension thereof, which-
ever occurs earlier. 
(b) An employee laid off and subsequently recalled to the 
Company's payroll in accordance with the covering seniority pro-
visions who shall again be laid orf at a subsequent date, shall 
be entitled to the benefits for the maximum period described in 
subsection (a) of this section, from the date last laid off and 
.M 
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no time or benefits received during previous periods of lay-
off shall be charged against the employee. 
!RTICLE VII. Administratio~ of the Plan 
General: The determination of the eligibility of any em-
ployee who applies for a weekly supplemental benefit and the 
Section 1. 
payment under the Plan of such benefit shall be 
made in accordance with the provisions of this 
Plan and administered by the Trustee of the Plan and in accord-
ance with the provisions of this Article. 
It shall be the function of the Board of ReView, estab-
lished in accordance with this Article, to make the final deci-
sion as to whether or not any applicant is eligible for a weekly 
supplemental benefit under the terms of the Plan and, if so, 
the amount of such, benefit, provided, however, that the Trustee 
shall make the initial determination in accordance with the 
provisions of this Plan. 
The Board of Review shall be presumed, conclusively, to 
have approved any such determination by the Trustee unless the 
employee who applied for such benefit shall have appealed from 
the determination in the manner outlined in this Article. 
Application for Benefits: The Trustee shall have the 
right to establish and, from time to time, modify reasonable 
Section 2. 
rules, regulations and procedures, which are not 
in conflict with the principles prescribed in 
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the Plan, concerning the times and places at which employees 
des1ring to apply for a weekly supplemental benefit shall re-
port in order to comply with the eligibility requirements as 
set out in the Plan, and concerning the form, content and sub-
stantiation of applications for benefits. 
The Trustee shall designate an office where employees laid 
off may appear for the filing of applications for benefits. The 
employee laid off under this Plan, and otherwise eligible in 
accordance with Article V of this Plan, shall be required to 
register and file his claim for unemployment compensation bene-
fits at his local office of the state Division of Employment 
Security within five (5) days of the day of layoff or the day 
following his layoff. The employee's registration card shall 
be exhibited when applying for benefits due him from the Fund 
for the "waiting periodu week required under the state system. 
The applicant shall be required to apply for benefits on a 
weekly basis during the week following the week for which he is 
claiming benefits, and after he has received his unemployment 
compensation check, or check from another employer. For any 
benefits claimed for the weeks laid off, subsequent to the first 
week, if otherwise eligible under Article V of this Plan, the 
applicant shall be required to exhibit his State unemployment 
compensation check. If the applicant was ineligible in any 
week to receive a State unemployment Compensation check for any 
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of the reasons stated in Article V, Section 2, b, 2, he shall, 
in lieu of exhibiting a check, payment receipt or similar docu-
ment, furnish satisfactory proof that he was ineligible due 
solely to such reasons. 
An applicant shall be required to exhibit his reporting 
card or any other form of evidence furnished by the State Divi-
sion of Employment Security as evidence that he has reported to 
the appropriate office maintained by the State system and that 
he has complied with the eligibility requirements and is eli-
gible to receive benefits under the State system. 
The Trustee may make reasonable requests, from time to 
time of the applicant for some proof of the fact that the appli-
cant has engaged in a personal search for other employment. 
The applicant shall certify in writing to the Trustee for 
the weeks benefits claimed: 
(a) the gross weekly compensation earned from other employ-
ment during the week.s claimed 
(b) such further and additional evidence and information 
as may be material or relevant in order to enable a determina-
tion to be made as to eligibility for any benefits under this 
Plan. 
Processing Applications! If the Trustee determines that 
a week.ly supplemental benefit is payable to an eligible appli-
Section 3. 
cant with respect to the week for which appli-
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cation is made, he shall arrange to oompute the amount and pay 
to suoh eligible applicant the benefit due such person as soon 
as it is reasonably possible. 
If the Trustee determines that an applicant is not en-
titled to a weekly supplemental benefit with respect to such 
week for which the applioation is made, the applicant shall be 
given prompt written notice thereof. 
Procedure for Appeals: It is the purpose of the Company 
and the Union to establish a procedure by which dispute as to 
Section 4. 
whether benefits are payable to an employee laid 
off, as to the amount of such benefits, or as to 
other matters regarding the interpretation of or compliance 
with the terms of this Plan, may be resolved 1n an expeditious 
and uniform manner. In the absence of any mutual agreement to 
the oontrary, all disputes regarding this Plan will be processed 
through the following procedure: 
(a) Any protest of the Trustee's decision as to whether 
benefits are payable under this Plan, shall be made within ten 
(10) days in writing to the Trustee. The answer should be made 
in writing by the Trustee to the applicant and to the Union 
within ten (10) days. 
(b) If no settlement has been effected, the applicant or 
the Union may appeal in writing to the Board of Review, com-
posed of two selected by the Union and two selected by the 
r 
.... 
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Company, setting forth the reasons for the complaint. The 
Board of Review will decide such claims within twenty (20) days 
following the receipt of the written complaint and shall notify 
the applicant, the Union and the Company in writing of its 
decision. 
(c) If any claim is not settled in accordance with the 
foregoing, it may be referred within thirty (30) days to the 
Union's staff representative designated by the Union and the 
Company's director of Personnel. In the event they fail to 
agree within a reasonable time, either party may submit the 
dispute to a Board of Arbitration by notifying the other party 
in writing of the decision to arbitrate. The Board of Arbitra-
tion shall be composed of Harold J. Gibbons, representing the 
Union, Fred M. Karches, representing the Company and Vincent P. 
Nangle, representing the public. 
(d) The Board of Arbitration, by majority opinion, Shall 
have the authority only to decide questions as to the inter-
pretation, application or compliance with the terms of this 
Plan and Shall not have authority to change the plan in any 
way. Expense of arbitration shall be borne equally by the 
Union and the Company. The Board's decision shall be final and 
binding on all parties concerned. 
(e) Any deciSion that is not appealed to the next step 
within the specified time limit will be considered settled on 
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the basis of the last decision given by the Trustee or the 
Board of Review. 
Cost of Administering the Plan: The costs and expenses 
incurred by the Trustee under the Plan shall be charged to the 
Fund as herein established. 
Section 5. 
ARTICLE VIII. Conditions to Effectiveness and Continuation 
- - -
of Plan 
Federal Income Tax Ruling: The Plan shall not become ef-
fective and no Company contribution shall be made to the Income 
Security Fund less and until the Company shall 
Section 1. 
have received from the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue a currently effective ruling or rulings, satisfactory 
to the Company, holding that such contributions shall consti-
tute a currently deduotible expense under the Internal Revenue 
Code, as now in effect, or under any other applicable Federal 
Income Tax Law. 
The Plan shall not become effective and no Company oontri-
bution shall be made to the Income Security Fund unless and 
Section 2. 
until the Plan shall have received a favorable 
ruling by the Missouri State Division of Employ-
ment Seourity, i.e., that benefits paid hereunder shall not con-
stitute wages to the exclusion of the payments of unemployment 
compensation benefits. 
The Plan shall not beoome effective and no Company contri-
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bution shall be made to the Income Security Fund less and until 
the Company shall have received from the United 
Section 3. 
States Department of Labor a currently effective 
ruling or rulings, satisfactory to the Company, holding that no 
part of such contribution shall be included in the regular rate 
of any employee. 
Termination of Plan if Rulings are Revoked: If any rulings 
Which have been obtained as required under Sections 1, 2 and 3 
Section 4-. 
above are, subsequent to the effective date of 
this plan, revoked or modified in such a manner 
as no longer to be satisfactory to the Company, all contribu-
tions and all obligations of the Company shall cease and the 
Plan shall thereupon terminate and be of no further effect, ex-
cept that the Inoome Security Fund assets Shall be distributed 
as provided for in Article III, Section 2 of this Plan. 
If this Plan Shall be terminated, the parties agree that 
Section 2, Article III of the collective bargaining agreement 
of March 20, 19,3, as amended, shall be restored, 
ARTICLE IX. .!1!!cellaneous 
Liability: (a) The Articles of this Plan constitute the 
entire plan. The provisions of this Plan express, and shall be 
deemed to express completely, each and every 
obligation of the Company with respect to financ-
ing the Plan and provisions of benefits and payments thereunder. 
Section 1. 
-------------_ .. _---- . 
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Without limiting the foregoing, no benefit shall be payable 
except as stated in the Plan, and the Company shall not be ob-
ligated to provide for any weekly supplemental benefit or pay-
ment not provided for in this Plan, or to make any contribution 
for benefits not specifically provided for in the Plan. 
(b) The Trustee, the Union, and the Company, and each of 
them, shall not be liable because of any act or failure to act 
on the part of any of the others, and eaoh is authorized to 
rely upon the oorrectness of any information furnished to him 
or it by an authorized representative of the others. 
(0) The Trustee shall be direoted to hold or to invest the 
assets of the Income Security only in cash, or in other short 
term government securities as provided for in Article III which 
may be readily liquidated, irrespective of the rate of return, 
or absence of return, and without any limit upon the amount 
that may be invested. 
No vester interest: Except as provided in this Plan, no 
employee shall have any right, title or interest in or to any 
Section 2. 
tions. 
of the assets of the Income Security Fund or in 
or to any accrued or deferred Company contribu-
No benefits shall be subject in any way to alienation, 
sale, transfer, aSSignment, pledge, attaohment, garnishment, or 
enoumbrance of any kind. 
----- ---------------------_ ... -_ .. _-
~ # k .,MIP 
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ARTICLE X. ~~endment and Termination 
Modification of Plan: (a) So long as the labor agreement 
ooncerning this Plan shall remain in effect, the Plan shall not 
Section 1. 
be amended, modified, suspended or terminated, 
except as may be provided or permissible under 
the terms of the Plan or the collective bargaining agreement ot 
March 20, 1953, as amended. 
Except as herein specifically amended, the said collective 
bargaining agreement of March 20, 1953, as amended by the amend-
Seotion 2. 
ing agreement of June 27, 1956, shall be con-
tinued in full force and effect for its full 
term, that is to say, to and including February 28. 1958. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their 
hands this 30th day of November, 1956 
RICE-STIX, INC. 
/s/ F. M. Karohes 
/s/ Joseph R. Wolf 
WAREHOUSE & DISTRIB:JTION 
WORKERS UNION 
Local 688, affiliated with the 
International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters Chauffeurs, Warehouse-
men and Helpers of America, 
A.F. of L. C.I.O. 
/s/ Edward C. Brown 
Local 688 Warehouse and 
DistributIon Workers' Union 
1127 Pine Street 
St, Louis 1, Missouri 
Gentlemen: 
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November 29, 19,6' 
With reference to the amending agreement entered into by 
the Union and the Company on November 30, 1956, establishing 
the Income Security Plan, the parties further agree that: 
1. Payments required of the Company under Article IX 
(Labor Health Institute) and Article XIV (Unity Welfare Associ-
at~n) of the collective bargaining agreement of March 20, 1953, 
shall continue to be made as provided in said articles for those 
employees eligible for benefits under the Income Security Plan. 
Such payments to be computed on the basis of the gross pay re-
ceived at time of layoff. 
No payments shall be due such employees if their cur-
rent employer is oovered under the Teamsters' Labor Health In-
stitute and Unity Welfare provisions. 
2. No employee, otherwise eligible to receive benefits 
under the Inoome Security Plan, shall be disqualified for such 
benefits if the employee were to be declared ineligible for 
said unemployment compensation benefits for reason of refusal 
to accept employment at a company or strike or where a picket 
line has been established. 
3. Employees who are otherwise eligible to receive 
I 
lllt-
benefits under the Income Security Plan, who are idled because 
of a strike or a picket line established at the company at 
which they are employed, shall have the "insurance" period, as 
defined in Article IV, Section 1, of the Income Security Plan, 
extended by the time lost because of such strike or picket line 
provided however, that the employee shall make application for 
such extension, in writing, not later than five (5) days fol-
lowing date of such idleness. 
Accepted: 
WAREHOUSE & DISTRIBUTION 
WORKERS' UNION 
Local 6dd, affiliated with the 
International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse-
men and Helpers of America, 
A.F. of L. - C.I.O. 
/s/ Edward C, Brown 
Very truly yours, 
RICE-STIX, INC. 
/s/ F. M. Karehes 
------~-----~------. 
APPENDIX V 
GENERAL STATEMENT OF COSTS 
Following are enumerated the expenditures for the opera-
tion of the Rice-Stix SUB program for a sixty-one week period 
oommending Monday, Deoember 31, 1956 and ending Friday, Febru-
ary 28, 1958. 
CASH PAYMENTS FOR ACTUAL WEEKLY BENEFITS, 
UNITY WELFARE PAYMENTS AND 
LABOR HEALTH INSTITJTE PAYMENTS 
A. Benefits ......•........•........ $238,092.1; 
B. Unity Welfare and Labor Health 
Inst1tute Payments .............. 77.391. 38 $315, .... 83.;3 (Total l~ of gross weekly wages 
pa1d before layoff - January and 
February 1958 est1mated) 
ESTIMATED ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
A. Salaries 
Payroll (approximately two days 
per week; rate $1. 99 per hour) .. ,$ 1,9 .... 2.24 
Personnel <.. .•••••..•••••.•••..• 10,300.00 
Clerioal (approximately It dars 
per week; rate $1.90 per hour) _. 
B. Misoellaneous Operating Costs 
1,390.80 
1. Employment Agency Fees > ••••• $ 1,531.72 (Charged Rice-Stix for plaoe-
ment of employees eligible 
for SUB) 
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$ 1,531.72 $329,116.57 
2. Printing (Application Blanks, 
Payroll Authorization Forma, 
Form Letters, etc.) ........ . 
Mailing and Postage ... *' ..... '" " 
333.37 
85.57 1,950.66 
$331,067.23 
STATISTICS 
Total number of employees eligible 
for benef its .. '......, .. '... . ... , .. '.,.... 318 
Average age of employees eligible ............. ,.... 45 
Average number of full benefits paid per week 
Total number of benefit claims filed in 
61 wee k per iod ....... ., .... " S • II ..... " ...... " " ••• " .... " • 
Average number of applications for benefits 
tiled per week ... It • \!I' .......... ., .. .- ...... " .. " .... ~ •• " of 
9,957 
163 
Average cost of benefits paid per week ............. $3,903.1, 
Average benefit paid per application per week ...... $23 95 
Average total benefit paid per employee " ...... ' .. . 
Average total fringe benefit (TlWA & LHI) 
paid per employee ............. ' .............. . 
Average total benefit paid per employee ........... . 
$243.37 
$992,,09 
Maximum payment to an individual employee .... _,0 _.0 $2,122.98 
, 
Name 
1. 
APPENDIX VI 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
If employed after lay-off t which of the three employment services gave you the leaa? 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
State Employment Service 
Union Employment Service 
Company Employment Service 
Through your own efforts 
2. Do you feel that you were referred to a job for which you 
were unsuited. Why? 
3. Were you ever disqualified or held ineligible for benefits 
under tne SUB Plan? It yes, for what reason? 
4. Why do you think the Company sold out? 
,. How much time elapsed after lay-otf before you obtained 
another permanent job? 
6. What is your personal opinion of the Supplemental Unemploy-
ment Benefit Plan and how it was administered? 
7. Would you prefer a severance pay plan to a Supplemental 
Unemployment Benefits Plan? 
8. Remarks you may wish to add: 
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